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ABSTRACT 
 Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to alter many aspects of military 
operations and improve overall operational effectiveness. One particularly complex 
mission domain for the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is air and missile defense 
(AMD). With the proliferation of more advanced weapons, there is a greater need for 
warfighters to quickly assess the situation, develop an appropriate course of action, and 
best utilize their warfare assets to respond. This series of activities requires warfighters to 
have a high level of trust in the system. However, trust in AI systems is not universally 
defined, and there is no common criteria for evaluating an AI system’s trustworthiness. 
 This thesis studies how the established trust factors in the literature could apply to 
the AMD domain to enable and enhance trust between human operators and future 
AI-AMD systems, and how trustworthiness can be designed into future AI-AMD 
systems. The thesis proposes a framework of trust and human-machine interactions 
(HMI) in AI-AMD systems. Thereafter, the thesis proposes a set of trust factors 
considering the operational and organization environment, as well as the operator and 
AI-AMD decision-aid team dynamics. This thesis uses the U.S. military solutioning 
framework of DOTMLPF-P (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and 
Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy) to develop a strategy to improve calibrated 
trust between the operator and AI-AMD system. 
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Currently, artificial intelligence (AI) offers tremendous opportunities to transform 
many domains of military operations, including warfighting, command and control (C2), 
logistics, security, and maintenance, to enhance their overall operational effectiveness. One 
particularly complex mission domain where the application of AI is critical is air and 
missile defense (AMD). The AMD mission refers to the defense of the homeland, protected 
areas, ground bases, ground forces, or ships against an adversarial air or missile threat. 
AMD threats include hostile aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or airborne 
missiles. Complexity in AMD operations stems from threat severity, the unexpected nature 
of the threat, uncertainty in situational knowledge, and the fast tempo of events as 
warfighters must quickly assess the situation, develop an appropriate course of action, and 
best utilize their warfare assets to respond. The United States Department of Defense (U.S. 
DOD) is studying the use of AI systems (or AI-enabled AMD [AI-AMD] systems) as 
automated decision aids for AMD warfighters to significantly reduce their cognitive load 
(Jones et al. 2020), enabling faster and better AMD decisions. 
One critical aspect of AI which has gathered a lot of research interest is trust. Trust 
is an essential tenet for effective teams. It applies to both humans and human-machine 
teams. Trust allows team members to work together well and is the foundation for effective 
team performance (Lee and See 2004). Successful collaboration with AI systems will 
necessitate humans having a calibrated level of trust and reliance on AI systems (Taylor et 
al. 2016).  
With the development and fielding of more advanced and faster air and missile 
threat munitions, there is a greater need for operators to make decisions quickly during 
AMD operations. Untimely decisions and responses will result in catastrophic 
consequences. Therefore, AI is a possible solution to speed up and enhance the decision-
making process through automated decision aids. These AMD automated battle 
management aids can help tactical operators cope with quicker decision cycles, massive 
volumes of data, and several systems or screens to watch (Galdorisi 2019). However, to 
effectively leverage the potential of AI capabilities, a high degree of operator trust is 
xviii 
needed. A low level of operator trust in the system may cause the AI-AMD system to be 
underutilized, unduly monitored, or not used at all (Floyd, Drinkwater, and Aha 2016). 
Any of these problems could result in an unnecessary increase in the operator’s workload 
or the possibility of mission failure. 
The thesis carried out an extensive review on the definitions of trust, concepts of 
human-machine interactions (HMI), trust factors, and conceptual models including models 
of AMD kill chains, threat scenarios, architectures, models, and functions. With this 
understanding, the thesis proposed a trust framework for the AI-AMD system, description 
of HMI and AI-AMD system trust factors. The thesis concluded with a strategy to achieve 
calibrated trust between the human operators and AI-AMD systems.  
The trust framework began with an analysis of the system context. Figure 1 shows 
a context diagram of the AI-AMD Command and Control (C2) system (which comprises 
of AI-AMD operator and decision aid) and other sub-systems it interacts with, that 
contribute to the development of trust between the operator and the AI-AMD decision aid. 
The context diagram allowed us to study the interactions amongst systems and their 
influences on the trust dynamics between the AI-AMD operators and decision aid.  
 
Figure 1. AI-AMD System Context Diagram.  
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The thesis defined trust as the operator’s attitude that an AI-AMD decision aid will 
help to achieve the operator’s goals of accomplishing the mission of destroying incoming 
threats promptly in an operational environment that is characterized by uncertainty and 
vulnerability. This definition of trust indicates that it is an emotional assessment of what 
the operator believes or perceives of the AI-AMD decision aid. To positively influence 
trust, the operator must personally see and feel the advantages of the AI-AMD decision aid 
actions. The AI-AMD operations involve a lot of uncertainties and vulnerabilities arising 
from the environmental factors of weather, electromagnetic interferences, and terrain as 
well as the nature of the ever-evolving threats. The operator will anticipate that the AI-
AMD decision aid performs as per “contracts” to deal with these uncertainties and 
vulnerabilities. The contracts will be the perceived functions or tasks that the AI-AMD 
decision aid is supposed to carry out as well as the desirable performance of carrying out 
these functions or tasks.  
Figure 2 illustrates the trust framework between the operators and AI-AMD 
decision aid. The y-axis represents the level of trust human has for the AI-AMD decision 
aid while the x-axis represents the capability of the AI-AMD decision aid. The green dotted 
45° line shows the optimum trust level or calibrated trust line, where trust corresponds to 
AI-AMD capabilities, resulting in proper utilization (Lee and See 2004). Over-trust is 
represented by the region above the optimum trust level line, when trust exceeds system 
capabilities, resulting in misuse. The zone below the ideal level of trust shows distrust, 
where trust falls short of system capabilities, resulting in disuse. It was assumed that there 
exists some level of default trust (shown as the yellow box), the goal is to develop a strategy 
to improve the trust given an AI-AMD decision aid capability. Trust violations might occur 
that reduce the operator’s trust when operating with the system. Hence, trust repair actions 
must be incorporated to maintain the trust at an optimum level.  
xx 
 
Figure 2.  Trust Between Human Operator and AI-AMD Decision Aid. 
 
The study on the HMI between the operator and AI-AMD decision aid based on 
functional allocations suggested that operators and AI-AMD decision aid should be 
designed to operate as a “team” across most of the kill chain functions. This directed the 
thesis to study trust factors that consider both the humans and decision aid dimensions 
individually and collectively. The study on the HMI between the operators and AI-AMD 
decision also revealed that the operators’ role has changed from manual controller to 
supervisory controller. A trustworthy decision aid is thus important as the operator would 
expect that the system performs as expected to help the operator perform his role better. 
Also, to further help ease the cognitive workload of the operator, the external representation 
of the information, recommendations from the decision aid must be easily readable and 
understood.  
On trust factors, the thesis proposed an “outside-in” framework as shown in Figure 
3. The thesis first considered factors associated with the operational environment which 
described the context of the AMD operation system. Second, it studied factors associated 
with the organizational environment where the operators and AI-AMD systems have been 
trained and developed. Third, the thesis studied the interactions between the operators and 
xxi 
AI-AMD decision aids to propose factors associated with both the operators, the AI-AMD, 
individually and collectively.  
 
Figure 3.  Proposed Trust Factors 
 
Figure 4 shows the proposed strategy articulation map to achieve calibrated trust 
between operator and AI-AMD decision aid. The review of the trust definitions, HMI, and 
trust factors suggested that the strategy should focus on three key areas: (1) collective and 
individual humans’ perception of automation technology and AI-AMD decision aid, (2) 
enhancing operator and AI-AMD decision aid team dynamics, and (3) trustworthiness of 
AI-AMD decision aid focusing on system development. The strategy proposed three key 
tenets and five supporting tenets using the DOTMLPF-P framework. First, military 
warfighters need to be informed of the true capabilities and limitations of automation 
technology, particularly AI-AMD decision aid. Second, the operator’s training 
requirements must increase to cope with a new job scope and evolving threats. Third, new 
requirements must be added to the AI-AMD decision aid system development to improve 
the system’s perceived trustworthiness. These three key tenets are supported by the other 
xxii 
aspects of the DOTMLPF-P framework such as organization, leadership, personnel, 
facilities, and policy.  
 
Figure 4. Strategy Articulation Map to Achieve Calibrated Trust Between Operator 
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A. STATEMENT OF NEED 
Machines have been a great and effective team player for the United States military. 
Over the years, the machines adopted by the U.S. military have evolved from simple 
remote-controlled vehicles to complicated autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) systems 
such as unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to support its missions in ever-increasingly 
volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) operational environments. Recently, 
the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has recognized the need for the swift adoption of 
AI to undertake a greater number of mission areas to improve future operational 
capabilities (Galdorisi 2019). The DOD has established clear direction with several 
roadmaps to enhance the levels of autonomy applied in the U.S. military (Winnefield and 
Kendall 2012). Machines are no longer just tools; they are becoming teammates with 
increasing intelligence and autonomy.  
One particularly complex mission domain for the U.S. DOD is air and missile 
defense (AMD). The AMD mission refers to the defense of the homeland, protected areas, 
ground bases, ground forces, or ships against an adversarial air or missile threat. AMD 
threats include hostile aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or airborne missiles. 
Complexity in AMD operations stems from threat severity, the unexpected nature of the 
threat, uncertainty in situational knowledge, and the fast tempo of events as warfighters 
must quickly assess the situation, develop an appropriate course of action, and best utilize 
their warfare assets (sensors, communications, weapons, and countermeasures) to respond. 
The U.S. DOD is studying the use of AI systems (or AI-enabled AMD [AI-AMD] systems) 
as automated decision aids for AMD warfighters to significantly reduce their cognitive 
load (Jones et al. 2020), enabling faster and better AMD decisions. 
Trust is an essential tenet for effective teams. It applies to both humans and human-
machine teams. Trust allows team members to work together well, and hence, is the 
foundation for effective team performance (Lee and See 2004). However, trust in AI 
systems is not unanimously well understood or well defined (Toreini et al. 2020). There is 
2 
no standard metric that can be used to describe trust in AI systems and to determine the 
trustworthiness of an AI system. Successful collaboration with AI systems will necessitate 
humans having a calibrated level of trust and reliance on AI systems (Taylor et al. 2016).  
1. Problem Statement 
  With the development and fielding of more advanced and faster air and missile 
threat munitions, there is a greater need for operators to make decisions quickly during 
AMD operations. Untimely decisions and responses will result in catastrophic 
consequences. Therefore, AI is a possible solution to speed up and enhance the decision-
making process through automated decision aids. These AMD automated battle 
management aids can help tactical operators cope with quicker decision cycles, massive 
volumes of data, and several systems or screens to watch (Galdorisi 2019). However, to 
effectively leverage the potential AI capabilities, a high degree of operator trust is needed. 
A low level of operator trust in the system may cause the AI-AMD system to be 
underutilized, unduly monitored, or not used at all (Floyd, Drinkwater, and Aha 2016). 
Any of these problems could result in an unnecessary increase in the operator’s workload 
or the possibility of mission failure.  
2. Thesis Objectives 
This thesis studied how the established trust factors in the literature can apply to 
the AMD domain to enable and enhance trust between human operators and future AI-
AMD systems; and how trustworthiness can be engineered into future AI-AMD systems.  
The thesis objectives are as follows:  
• Understand and describe trust and human-machine interactions (HMI) of future 
AI-AMD systems. 
• Conduct an in-depth study of trust factors and their impacts on the kill chain 
functions of the conceptual AI-AMD system. 
• Develop AMD threat scenarios to study the operational outcomes of variances 
in trust.  
• Propose a strategy to improve trust between the operator and AI-AMD system.  
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B. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION  
(1) Introduction of AI to Military Operations 
  Over the past decade, AI has gained tremendous attention (Palmer, Selwyn, and 
Zwillinger 2016). AI has been adopted in many government services, businesses, and 
industries. As AI technology matures, it is increasingly poised to be applied to military 
operations (Scharre 2018). Currently, AI offers tremendous opportunities to transform 
many domains of military operations, including warfighting, command and control (C2), 
logistics, security, and maintenance, to enhance their overall operational effectiveness. As 
such, the U.S. DOD has recognized the need to adopt AI technology and has developed an 
AI Strategy (U.S. DOD 2018) to hasten the adoption of AI across military missions and 
domains. 
(2) Adoption of Five AI Ethical Principles by DOD 
  While there are huge benefits from leveraging AI, its adoption has also initiated 
numerous debates on ethical and trust aspects due to its infancy, ambiguity, and risks. The 
U.S. DOD has acknowledged these challenges and in February 2020, officially announced 
its development of DOD ethical principles, namely that AI systems be: (1) equitable, (2) 
responsible, (3) reliable, (4) traceable, and (5) governable to guide the ethical and lawful 
adoption of AI (U.S. DOD 2020). This news indicates that the DOD is serious about how 
AI capabilities are used, and not just setting a course for the unrestrained adoption of AI 
(Lamberth 2020).  
(3) Poor Understanding of Trust in AI Systems 
  However, there is a challenge in translating the five ethical principles into 
frameworks that can be institutionalized across the various services and missions within 
the DOD that guide the engineering of operational systems (Lamberth 2020). For instance, 
trust in AI systems is a critical tenet that is linked to the five principles. Trust in AI systems 
is not unanimously well understood nor well defined (Toreini et al. 2020). No standard 
metric exists to evaluate the trustworthiness of an AI system or how the level of 
trustworthiness may affect system performance.  
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(4) Trust in AI-AMD Systems 
  The AMD mission is critical to preserving and protecting defended areas and DOD 
forces against adversaries’ missiles, aircraft, and UAVs. With the fielding of more 
advanced weapons such as loitering munitions and hypersonic missiles, AMD operations 
become more complex and time-sensitive in the ability to quickly identify, assess, and 
neutralize these threats. There is a need for warfighters to make precise and fast decisions 
in response to these threats. A recent NPS project (Jones et al. 2020) analyzed the usage of 
AI to enhance situation awareness (SA) and battle management decision-making in the 
time-sensitive AMD domain. It was concluded that the application of AI will reduce the 
time required to respond to a threat significantly, expediting the AMD kill chain. However, 
the tenets of trust to determine the trustworthiness of an AI-AMD system that relates to the 
ethical principles were not considered. There is a need to understand this to develop a 
strategy to engineer a trustworthy system that meets both its operational needs and adheres 
to ethical principles. 
(5) Importance of Trust – Remembering the USS Vincennes Incident 
On July 3, 1988, the USS Vincennes accidentally shot down Iran Air’s Commercial 
Flight 655. During this incident, the USS Vincennes’ radar had identified a plane, and a 
follow-on standard Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) query identified the plane as a 
commercial airliner. The commanding officer, Capt. Will C. Rogers III relied on his own 
judgement and deduced that the plane was an F-14 and was diving towards USS Vincennes 
(CG-49). A nearby ship, the USS Sides (FFG-14), which was covering the same airspace, 
received the same radar and IFF information concerning the Iranian plane from its systems; 
yet it did not react in the same manner. The commanding officer of USS Sides acted 
differently as he responded primarily to the data provided on the radar screen (McCabe 
2014). This incident highlighted the complex dynamics of humans-machines trust and the 
consequences of wrong perceptions of the data. 
C. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This thesis is a continuation of the overarching direction that the DOD is 
undertaking in the development and institutionalization of AI ethical principles across all 
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services. Specifically, this thesis will increase the understanding of the trust factors in an 
AI-AMD system. The proposed trust strategy will provide us insights into developing 
trustworthy AI-AMD systems that meet operational requirements while not violating any 
ethical principles. This thesis is also an extension of the DOD’s goal of implementing 
aligned AI ethical principles into AI systems across its many mission domains. The trust 
strategy will also provide insights that can be applied to other non-military AI systems.  
D. RESEARCH METHOD AND THESIS ORGANIZATION 
(1) Research and Analysis Method  
This thesis applied an analysis and design research method, as illustrated in Figure 
1. The study began with a literature review on AI and trust that explored researchers’ work 
on human-machine interactions, trust factors, and methods for engineering trust that are 
applicable to existing AI systems. Next, the literature review explored AMD, including 
models of AMD kill chains, threat scenarios, architectures, models, and functions in 
relation to the human-machine interactions and trust factors that have been developed for 
other AI systems. 
In the second stage of research, the study applied a systems analysis approach to 
identify human-machine interactions (HMI) in each of the kill chain functions and analyze 
each in terms of the identified trust factors such as complexity of the situation, 
predictability, explainability, reliability, and decision risks, etc.  
In the third and final phase of research, the study identified and analyzed solutions 
to form a strategy to achieve calibrated trust between human and AI-AMD system and the 
development of a trustworthy AI-AMD system.  
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Figure 1. Thesis Methodology 
(2) Thesis Organization  
This thesis is divided into six chapters, including the current Chapter I:  
Introduction. Chapter II consists of a comprehensive literature review of the existing work 
done on trust, human-machine interactions and trust models and factors on existing 
systems. Chapter III contains an overview of the AI-AMD threat scenarios and operations 
and its conceptual system architecture. Chapter IV describes the trust in human and AI-
AMD teaming, human-machine interactions that exist in the AI-AMD operations. It also 
lays out the trust factors that are applicable to the AI-AMD operations. Chapter V discusses 
the strategies to improve trust between the operator and AI-AMD system. Finally, Chapter 
VI concludes the collaborative study with comments and recommendations for future 
research in trust modeling of human-machine interactions and AI-AMD.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW – TRUST IN AI SYSTEMS 
This chapter presents the first part of the extensive literature review which explored 
trust and its relationship with AI systems. Figure 2 shows the flow of Chapter II. First, AI 
was defined to better understand its characteristics and capabilities. After understanding 
what an AI system is, an in-depth literature review on the human-machine interaction 
(HMI) was carried out where the “machine” in this thesis is regarded as an AI system. The 
insights gained from this review form the basis for later describing the HMI of an AI-AMD 
system. 
 
Figure 2. Schematic of the Flow of Chapter II. 
Next, the various definitions in the literature of trust and its related trust elements 
were reviewed to deepen the understanding of human-AI trust. The chapter concludes with 
an in-depth review of the possible factors that affect trust between humans and AI systems. 
The insights gained from this literature review provide a foundation of knowledge for 
understanding trust between operators and AI-AMD system, and for postulating possible 
human-AI trust factors that are important in an AI-AMD system. Establishing trust factors 
for future AI-AMD systems is key to engineering trustworthy systems and achieving 
effective HMI for trust development. 
A. DEFINING AI SYSTEM 
This thesis adopted the DOD’s definition of AI: “the ability of machines to perform 
tasks that normally require human intelligence—for instance, recognizing patterns, 
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learning from experience, drawing conclusions, making predictions, or taking action—
whether digitally or as the smart software behind autonomous physical systems” (U.S. 
DOD 2018, 5). From the DOD’s perspective, an AI system is any automation system that 
possesses a smart computer agent who can perform tasks with human-like intelligence that 
is attributed with the intent of a user. This type of intelligence is however different from 
biological human intelligence as it is built with machine intelligence. The AI-AMD system 
studied into this thesis fits in to this definition as the AI developed by humans supports the 
tasks listed by the DOD from recognizing pattern to making predictions in aiding the 
operators to act more swiftly.  
B. DEFINING TRUST IN AI SYSTEM  
This section reviews various established definitions of impersonal trust and human-
automation trust to define human-machine trust with the AI-AMD domain. Subsequently, 
different elements of trust were also defined to better define trust in an AI-AMD system. 
An important concept of trustworthiness was also highlighted in this section to clarify the 
differences between trust and trustworthiness.  
1. Default Trust, Impersonal Trust and Human-AI Trust 
Often, humans do not pause to deliberately ponder about whether or how they trust 
the machine or technology they use. This is called default trust. This happens when humans 
accept the decisions and actions of machines without any concerns. On the other hand, the 
notion of trust is very deliberative. In such cases, people exercise extreme caution when 
deciding whether to trust a machine or technology, as well as the conditions connected with 
trusting machines (Hoffman et al. 2013).  
Trust is the foundation of most of the fundamental relationships in human life; and 
without it, many valuable social interactions and bonds would be jeopardized. Without 
trust, we are going to be isolationist and suspicious because of fear of harm and dishonesty 
(O’neill 2002). To trust someone often requires a belief about their trustworthiness. 
Trusting someone can be about having confidence in them to carry out a particular task. 
To be trustworthy, one must have the ability to satisfy the trust that is placed on them. One 
must be capable of being trusted (Ryan 2020).  
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There are several definitions of trust in the literature. According to a review of the 
literature, trust can be described as a belief, attitude, intention, or behavior. Fishbein and 
Ajzen (1977) proposed a model to help to reconcile the conflicting nature of the definitions 
of trust as depicted in Figure 3. Based on the authors’ model, behavior is a result of 
intention; and intention is derived from attitudes. Beliefs and perceptions serve as the 
foundation for trust as well as knowledge base that influences attitudes. The amount and 
accuracy of information, as well as human encounters, impact people’s beliefs. 
Attitude refers to an emotional assessment of beliefs that motivates humans to act 
in a certain way (Lee and See 2004). Intention then leads to behavior, which is influenced 
by the cognitive, social, and external environment restrictions. Within the context of trust, 
Lee and See (2004) argued that trust is an attitude. A person’s beliefs create trust, and 
different levels of trust will lead to different intentions and behaviors. As such, Lee and 
See (2004) defined trust as an “attitude that an agent will help achieve an individual’s goals 
in a situation characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability.” Thus, trust aims to eliminate 
ambiguity in a person’s life by anticipating the outcome of specific conduct, and to make 
it easier for individuals to work together (Jacovi et al. 2021).  
 
Figure 3. Framework of Trust. Adapted from Ajzen and Fishbein (1977). 
Like interpersonal trust, human-AI trust has been a critical element of the HMI, as 
incorrect levels of trust will result in undesirable consequences. According to Jacovi et al. 
(2021) and Hoffman (2017), trust between humans and AI systems includes the concepts 
of anticipation, uncertainty, and vulnerability. Humans want to develop interpersonal trust 
between each other to reduce uncertainty and risk of working together. This is supported 
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by the expectation or conviction that one side will act in the best interests of the other. 
Trust occurs between humans and AI for the same reason. 
2. Contractual Trust  
Human-AI trust is premised on what the human anticipates in the AI system’s 
behavior. Trust is not built based on the general AI system performance ability, but the 
specific tasks with explanation that a human expects from the AI system (Hawley 2014; 
Tallant 2017). This is contractual trust. Human-AI contractual trust happens when a person 
believes that the AI system will follow a specific contract established between them. 
Contract can refer to any features that the AI system performs even if it is not the original 
performance function that the AI system was trained for. As contracts specify the behavior 
anticipated from an AI system, they become important in understanding human-AI trust as 
it enables us to make clear the objective of anticipation. As such, to trust an AI system 
means that human believes that contracts will be maintained and accepts vulnerability to 
the AI’s actions (Jacovi et al. 2021). Then, by trusting the AI system, humans hope to 
predict that the AI system will uphold the contract in the face of uncertainty. 
3. Trust Repair 
“Once lost, trust in automation, like interpersonal trust, can be hard to re-establish.”  
— Hoffman et al. (2013,85)  
Another important aspect of trust - trust repair - is defined an action to improve 
trust after a trust violation has taken place. Researchers de-Visser, Pak, and Shaw (2018) 
demonstrated that being able to repair trust contributes to a healthy relationship. For 
example, the best functioning human teams are those who participate in team building, 
trust rebuilding, and exposing one’s own emotional vulnerabilities (Duhigg 2016). High 
performing human team members will engage in activities to help each other perform better 
for a better team performance. This is the type of behavior we need to implant in AI systems 
in order to create a high-performing human–AI collaboration. 
However, numerous researchers have demonstrated that there are significant 
differences between humans and AI systems. This is because AI systems are perceived to 
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be more reliable due to their invariance in performance. Any trust repairs actions such as 
apology notifications or explanations might be less effective if humans perceive that the 
AI systems behaviors are fixed and not likely to change (de Visser et al. 2016). 
Additionally, AI systems performing trust repair actions such as apology prompts, or 
explanations may be seen by humans as inadequate, as autonomous systems are expected 
to change their behaviors and learn from their errors. Hence, this aspect of trust repair on 
autonomous systems will be considered in this thesis to ensure that trust can continue to 
improve for sustained performance (de Visser et al. 2016).  
4. Trustworthy AI 
In human-AI trust, trust and being trustworthy (trustworthiness) are distinctly 
different. Trust as defined earlier is an attitude of the human operator while trustworthy is 
a feature of the AI system. An AI system is considered trustworthy to some contracts if it 
can uphold the contracts that the operator desires. Trust and trustworthiness are 
independent because the pursuit of one may not necessarily lead to the other. 
Trustworthiness may not always lead to trust. On the contrary, trust in an AI system can 
exist even with an untrustworthy system (Jacovi et al. 2021; Wright 2010). Lee and See 
(2004) and Jacovi et al. (2021) asserted that warranted trust exists because of 
trustworthiness. Else, unwarranted trust is being developed. In other words, warranted trust 
happens when the anticipation of the desired AI system behaviors becomes a reality. To 
develop warranted trust, there is a need to influence the trustworthiness of the AI model in 
the system.  
5. Trust Calibration, Resolution and Specificity 
Trust is a crucial element of human-AI interactions, since improper levels of trust 
may result in the AI system being misused or disused (Wicks, Berman, and Jones 1999). 
Misuse of AI system occurs when there is over-reliance on the system which may cause 
human monitoring failures or decision biases. Disuse of AI system occurs when humans 
neglect or underutilize the system (Parasuraman and Riley 1997).  
Establishing the “right” amount of trust is critical in preventing AI system misuse 
and abuse since it promotes productive human-AI relationships (Wicks, Berman, and Jones 
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1999). The ideas of trust calibration, trust resolution, and trust specificity explain the gaps 
between trust and AI capabilities (Lee and See 2004). Trust calibration is the link between 
human-AI trust and AI capabilities (Lee and Moray 1992). When human places more trust 
than the what the AI system is capable of, over-trust (a poor calibration) happens. This will 
lead to misuse, in which a person is overly dependent on AI, failing to overrule the AI 
system when needed. On the other hand, distrust happens when the human-AI is falls below 
of that AI system capabilities. This leads to disuse in which a person fails to use AI when 
doing so would enhance the overall performance. As a result, a person’s trust in the AI 
system must be calibrated so that acceptable levels of human-AI trust grow to prevent 
misuse or disuse (Merritt et al. 2013; Parasuraman and Miller 2004). The 45-degree line in 
Figure 4 depicts good calibration of trust (calibrated trust), where the amount of trust 
matches with AI capabilities. Over-trust is represented in the region above the diagonal 
line and below it is distrust.  
 
Figure 4. Relationship between Trust Calibration and Automation 
Capability. Source: Lee and See (2004). 
Trust resolution is defined as the precision of a trust judgement that distinguishes 
the levels of automation (LOA) capability (Cohen, Parasuraman, and Freeman 1998). 
Figure 4 shows that poor resolution is a result of having a wide range of AI capability being 
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mapped onto a small range of trust. When trust resolution is poor, the human-AI trust is 
less reflective of the AI capabilities related because huge changes in automation capability 
do not bring about the same level of changes in trust.  
Functional specificity refers to the extent to which trust is reflective of the 
functions, sub-functions, or modes of the AI. A high level of functional specificity in an 
AI system indicates that an individual’s confidence reflects a specific sub-function capacity 
or mode of AI. Low functional specificity, on the other hand, suggests that an individual’s 
trust reflects the AI system’s overall capabilities (Lee and See 2004).  
Specificity can also describe variations in trust caused by varying situation or over 
time. Researchers of trust in AI generally acknowledge that trust is dynamic rather than 
being defined by a state. Trust increases or declines over time (Hoffman 2017). The 
sensitivity of trust to changes in AI capability caused by environmental changes is 
described by temporal specificity. A person’s trust in a situation with great temporal 
specificity reflects the ongoing changes in AI capability throughout time. On the other 
hand, because trust has a low temporal specificity, it only reflects long-term differences in 
AI capabilities. Temporal specificity provides insights on the improvements to implement 
when the environment changes, affecting the AI system’s capabilities. 
In conclusion, calibrated trust, good trust resolution, and high specificity can 
decrease the possibilities of AI misuse and disuse. Trust with a high functional and 
temporal specificity suggests that the changes in trust will likely be influenced by the 
changes in the AI capabilities over time (Lee and See 2004). These concepts can guide the 
engineering design, assessment, and training to improve human-AI partnerships. 
C. HUMAN-MACHINE INTERACTIONS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
SYSTEMS 
This section contains information gathered about existing work on human-machine 
interactions (HMI). The literature review included a review of HMI concepts and 
characteristics, as these HMI will influence human trust in a system (Abbass 2019).  
The review of HMI included HMI models, levels of automation corresponding to 
human information processing, mappings of system functions that can be automated, and 
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HMI design considerations and constructs. A case study was reviewed that proposes an 
automation taxonomy for air traffic management. The case study was reviewed to draw 
additional insights for effective HMI.  
1. Characterization of Human-Machine Interactions 
In this thesis, “machine” is regarded as an AI system. HMI is defined as the 
interactions and communications between people and autonomous systems via a user 
interface (Toreini et al.). According to Norman (1984), HMI can be characterized into a 
series of four stages of activities: (1) intention, (2) selection, (3) execution, and (4) 
evaluation as shown in Figure 5.  
• Intention stage is the human’s mental interpretation of a goal.  
• Selection stage translates the intention into actions. Humans must review all 
possible options and determine the best option that satisfies the intention. Then, the 
actual sequence of actions must be specified to the machine.  
• Execution is the stage where humans physically enter the information into the 
computer to carry out the tasks.  
• Evaluation is the stage where the results of the actions are reviewed for further 
activity. Feedback is sought to improve the system via an iterative loop.  
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Figure 5. Stages, Design Considerations and Support Tools of HMI 
Activities. Adapted from Norman (1984). 
This model of HMI characterization is just an approximation of the actual 
interactions between humans and machines. Humans may not possess or execute well-
defined stages of decision and action. Humans are often not fully aware of the reasons for 
their own actions; humans sometimes perform actions that do not fulfil their intentions. 
Humans’ decision-making processes are comprised of complicated and highly parallel 
processing that includes both conscious and sub-conscious processing of many factors. 
Nevertheless, Norman’s (1984) four-stage series model approximations provide relevant 
insights in this thesis.  
The system design considerations relevant to each of the stages of HMI are also 
summarized in Figure 5. These considerations serve as guides to assist designers in 
building their systems according to the four stages of HMI to enhance the interactions 
between operators and the automated system. Additionally, the user support tools relevant 
to each stage that can help to improve the HMI are summarized at the bottom of Figure 5. 
These tools help to address the system design considerations to improve HMI.  
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2. Levels of Machine Automation and Human Information Processing – 
Deep Dive into “Selecting an Action” Stage of Human-Machine 
Interactions 
Automation is the partial or complete replacement of a task or function formerly 
carried out by a human (Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens 2000). This concept implies 
that a system’s level of automation (LOA) does not have to be “all or nothing.” The LOA 
of a system can range from entirely manual to completely automatic. Table 1 shows a 10-
point scale for automation, with higher values indicating a higher autonomy of the system 
over human action. For instance, at lower levels of automation, the machine recommends 
courses of actions, but the human has the ultimate authority for executing the courses of 
action (COA). On the contrary, at higher levels of automation, the machine has more 
control over decisions and actions, leaving humans with simpler roles.  
Table 1. 10-point Scale for Automation of Decision and Action Selection. 
Source: Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens (2000). 
 
 
Sheridan (2002) also proposed the notions of shared control and control trading. 
When a human and a machine control various components of the system simultaneously, 
this is referred to as shared control. The machine is employed in a shared control system to 
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augment humans’ abilities beyond what humans can do or to assist humans in making their 
work easier (Sheridan 2002). On the other hand, trading of control happens when the 
machine is employed to take over the role of the human or backs up the human when the 
human falters. In addition, Sheridan (2002) also commented that there are forms of 
cooperative control which happens when the control is triggered by either the human or 
machine and the other processes or improves it.  
The key challenge in a shared control system is proper distribution of tasks between 
humans and machines to ensure coherence actions for both the human operators and 
machines. The key challenge in a trading control system is determining when control 
should be handed over to the machine and when it should be returned to the human. 
Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens (2000) proposed an extended form of the 
model to include the automation of various types of functions such as input functions 
present in HMI. Table 1 shows the levels of automation, which largely apply to the 
automation of output functions such as decisions and actions. As such, a four-stage model 
representing human information processing was developed as shown in Figure 6. 
 
• Stage 1 – Sensory processing is the receiving and registering of information from 
different sources. This stage involves the placement of sensors, sensory processing, 
handling of data, understanding of data information, and selective attention.  
• Stage 2 – Perception/working memory involves mindful view and understanding of 
the retrieved and processed information that is available in the human mind. This 
stage consists of cognitive processes like inference, assimilation and rehearsal that 
are carried out before the decision point.  
• Stage 3 – Decision making is the cognitive processing of making decisions  
• Stage 4 – Response selection is to act upon the decision made.  
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Figure 6. Four-Stage Model of Human Information Processing. Adapted 
from Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens (2000).  
Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens (2000) has mapped the above four-stage 
model to equivalent system functions that may be automated as shown in Figure 7. The 
different LOA as depicted in Table 1 can be applied to these system functions.  
• Function 1 – The gathering, identification, and recording of input data is 
information acquisition. These tasks are analogous to the stage of human 
information processing. 
• Function 2 – Information analysis involves cognitive functions like discovering and 
interpreting information. At high levels of automation, it involves fusing of 
multiple input data into a single data.  
• Function 3 – Decision and action selection involve making a choice among various 
options. Different degree of substitution or augmentation of human selection 
process can be automated with machine processes.  
• Function 4 – Action implementation translates the COA into executable actions. At 
this stage, automation entails varying degrees of machine execution that substitute 
human hands or voices. 
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Figure 7. Mapping of System Functions to Four-Stage Model of Human 
Information Processing. Source: Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens 
(2000).  
 It is also worth noting that the LOA for these functions can change based on the 
system context (situation and environment) during actual operational use. Figure 8 depicts 
a framework developed by Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens (2000) for automation 
design. These authors’ framework proposes a stepwise and iterative process to guide 
automation design; in determining whether automation should be utilized to a particular 
function. Next, the level of automation of each function should be determined. In this 
model, the authors proposed that the level of automation should be assessed by first 
considering human limitations such as cognitive workload, situational awareness (SA), and 
skills decay. Then, secondary factors such as automation capability, and associated impacts 
of automation decision/action consequences should be considered. The application and 
evaluation of these factors should be an iterative process too. However, it is noted that this 
framework is not a “be-all and end-all,” but it serves as a useful guiding principle for 
subsequent detailed consideration. 
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Figure 8. Flow Chart to Guide Levels of Automation Design. Source: 
Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens (2000).  
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3. Human-Machine Interactions Design Constructs  
Pritchett and Feary (2011) proposed that to describe HMI sufficiently, five 
constructs of authority, teams, work, representations, and interface mechanisms must be 
established in a coordinated manner at varying levels of abstraction as shown in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9. Five Constructs of HMI. Adapted from Pritchett and Feary (2011).  
a. Construct 1 – Authority  
Authority is defined as the accountability of outcomes that is demanded of an agent 
who is performing it. At the highest level of abstraction, an authority on the automation 
agent must be defined for accountability for outcomes. When accountability for an outcome 
is demanded of an automation agent with the power to execute it, the true capability exists. 
The difficulty for true authority is to ensure that accountability for all outcomes to agents 
is clearly defined throughout the lifetime of operations. Hence, establishing effective HMI 
requires coherent technology design (machine capabilities and methods of execution) and 
policy (accountability). 
b. Construct 2 – Team   
A team is defined as individuals who work together inter-dependently to 
accomplish a shared goal. A construct about teams is to examine how the humans and 
automation systems coordinate their specific functions like shared situation awareness 
(SA) and team maintenance. Autonomous systems are regarded as teammates. A shared 
mental model, often known as “team knowledge” or “shared situation awareness,” 
underpins teamwork. Conditions for a shared mental model include: (1) each possesses the 
requisite knowledge, (2) each knows what information the rest possess should he seeks it, 
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and (3) each knows which information and when the other teammate needs it. The mental 
model supports team interactions and assists each team member create a clear expectation 
of each other and task. As such, achieving a shared mental model for teams is a common 
goal of many training programmes.  
Shared mental models amongst teammates are also important for coordination and 
communication for high performing teams. However, communications amongst teammates 
can be disrupted. As a result, it is critical to “build in” or engineer team structures and 
shared mental models that enable teammates to anticipate one another’s information needs 
and supply information at non-interruptive junctures. However, the inclusion of automation 
demands additional requirements for communications and synchronization amongst 
teammates. So, the challenge for effective HMI is to integrate the essence of human-
machine teams interactions into action-oriented guides for automation designers to better 
assist and fulfil the needs of humans.  
c. Construct 3 – Work   
Work engages in purposeful activity. A construct about work is to examine the 
activities and interactions required across all automation agents to perform the tasks and 
meet their goals. It is important to address the segregation of work in terms of “what needs 
to be done” and “who does what” to meet the system goals. Beyer (1998) developed a 
contextual design model of work to design information technology for somewhat static 
domains. This model has five perspectives as follows:  
• Data and items exchanged amongst teammates  
• Organizational culture influencing work  
• Physical environment supporting work  
• Support tools for work  
• Sequence of activities to enable work  
This model can be extended to work in a dynamic environment by including 
analysis on mission task, purpose, work objectives, success metric, utility function, event 
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triggers, task cruciality, timing, and limiting conditions for the work processes (Billman et 
al. 2010).  
d. Construct 4 – Representation  
Representation is defined as the presentation within the mind of an image, idea, or 
concept. A construct about representation is to examine how humans perceive and 
conceptualize the environment to design in automation so that its actions are 
understandable to, and interactable with, humans. External representations, such as 
interfaces and displays, according to Zhang and Norman (1994), can influence cognitive 
behavior, change the character of human tasks, and give easily understood information that 
can be used easily. Hence, these representations seek to improve or leverage human 
perceptual and cognitive processes to improve performance. Pritchett and Feary (2011) 
argued that effective HMI is dependent on shared representations except for instances 
where the automated system can execute its tasks without any inputs and supervision from 
humans. Specifically, HMI involves these four representations:  
• The automated system must have an internal representation of the functions 
such as controls loops, event triggers or established rules to carry out the work.  
• Humans must also possess an internal representation of cooperative work. The 
representation will be the most elaborated for the exact work an operator is 
assigned to. However, it is important for the operator to have a representation 
of their teammates’ work to understand their requirements or activities for 
effective teaming. 
• An explicit representation of the automation’s output and processes must be 
displayed to the human. Also, some automated systems may display humans’ 
actions and processes. 
• A representation of the environment may also be made available to the human.  
These four representations suggest that there is a need to make sure that there is 
observability of the automated system’s functioning, as well as coherent internal and 
external representations that drive the system’s behavior. Additionally, the automation’s 
functioning should be understandable to the human, and consistent with the work 
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environment. As such, a common representation construct between humans and machines 
is needed.  
e. Construct 5 – Interface Mechanisms   
The interface mechanisms construct investigates the exchange of information 
between humans and automated systems, and the actions required by each entity to carry 
out planned behavior. Interfaces are generally where the problems with HMI are revealed. 
Current interface technology such as keyboards, computer displays, verbal communication, 
gesture communication, buttons, and other input tools to input instructions or commands 
all have their own limitations and present HMI issues. Nonetheless, interface difficulties 
can be addressed with integrated tools by considering the four constructs outlined above 
with the characteristics of the interfaces and the way human processes information. This 
HMI design should allow designers to (Pritchett and Feary 2011):  
• Improve understanding of both targeted performance measurements and human 
preferences indicating competing performance trade-offs in the work domain. 
• Transform what has been learnt about the job into a suitable representation. 
• Design interfaces by matching activity representation to suitable interface 
devices.  
• Employ human performance analysis and computational automation tools to 
assess prototypes during system development and optimize the interface 
performance against the performance metrics and human preferences.  
4. Joint Activity Theory of Human-Machine Interactions 
Bradshaw, Feltovich, and Johnson (2012) argued that the HMI is not so much about 
the allocation of tasks to humans or machines, but rather should focus on how tasks are 
allocated and shared between humans and machines who work together. For instance, 
Hoffman et al. (2002) developed a list to demonstrate how humans and machines can 
complement each other through mutual interactions to improve the overall performance as 
shown in Table 2. Understanding both human and machine strengths and limitations is 
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crucial for effective HMI to bring them together to enhance the performance of human-
machine teams.  
Table 2. HMI to Enhance Performance. Adapted from Bradshaw, Feltovich, 
and Johnson (2012).  
 
 
 Bradshaw, Feltovich, and Johnson (2012) went on to examine successful HMI 
using joint activity theory. Joint activity theory focuses on interdependence where parties 
come together to deliver a genuine joint product. The authors summarized the following 
maxims for an effective HMI as shown in Table 3.  
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Table 3. Eight Maxims for Good Human or Machine Agent. Source: 
Bradshaw, Feltovich, and Johnson (2012). 
 
 
5. Automation Taxonomy for HMI in Air Traffic Management 
Save, Feuerberg, and Avia (2012) presented a new taxonomy of autonomy to 
identify and compare various types of automation that help in air traffic management. 
However, Save, Feuerberg, and Avia (2012) argued that the principles and the description 
of this taxonomy are not only limited to this field of air traffic management but transferable 
to other domains. This taxonomy is grounded on Sheridan and Verplank (1978) idea to 
decide on the extent of automation rather than whether to automate a task entirely or not 
and Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens (2000) framework of the four generic HMI 
functions. While the earlier models succeeded in acknowledging the different nature of 
automation support, specific levels for each of the functions have not been defined. This 
reduced the model’s ability to provide human aspects recommendations in automation 
design. As such, this taxonomy attempted to address the issue of identifying different LOA 
by considering the various ways in which automation could increase human performance. 
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The taxonomy was developed based on the following principles and are given in 
Tables 4–6:  
• An automated system cannot have one “overall” level of automation applied to 
all functions. Different levels of automation must be applied to specific 
functions within the system. 
• One automated system can support more than one function. Each function is 
expected to have different LOA.  













Table 4. Proposed New Taxonomy for Air Traffic Management (Part I). 
Source: Save, Feuerberg, and Avia (2012).  
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Table 5. Proposed New Taxonomy for Air Traffic Management (Part II). 




Table 6. Proposed New Taxonomy for Air Traffic Management (Part III). 
Source:  Save, Feuerberg, and Avia (2012). 
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D. TRUST FACTORS IN AI SYSTEMS 
This section offers an overview of the elements that influence the establishment of 
human trust in automated/autonomous systems. The review of the trust factors is critical to 
deriving strategy and engineered solutions to improve the trust between humans and AI-
AMD systems. Broadly, three schools of thought on trust developments were reviewed: 
First, Schaefer et al. (2016) proposed a three-factor trust model that is based upon 
the human, the partner (system), and the environment of trust. It is a meta-analysis of other 
researchers’ work on the trust development of automated systems. Other researchers’ work 
was also reviewed to complement the analysis done by Schaefer et al. (2016).  
Second, Sheridan (2019) categorized trust factors into objective and subjective 
attributes. His work emphasized the importance of subjective factors in influencing trust 
development in current and future automated and autonomous systems. These subjective 
factors emerged against the backdrop of more advanced and intelligent automation and 
autonomous systems.  
Third, Denning (2016) developed a six-user level software quality assessment. 
Denning’s work was based on the observation that trust is made by human beings. While 
there could be objective measures to support trust development, there is no algorithm that 
can make the final determination of trust. It is ultimately a human’s decision. As such, he 
proposed an assessment metric that addresses the fundamental questions of whether the 
software helps the operators in their work and whether the operator can depend on it. These 
insights further support Sheridan’s (2019) assertion on the emergence of subjective factors.  
1. Schaefer et al.’s (2016) Three-Factor Trust Model 
 Following an exhaustive analysis of trust in automation systems, Schaefer et al. 
(2016) suggested a three-factor trust model. In this section of the thesis, the Schaefer et al. 
(2016) model will be adopted as the main framework for the analysis of trust factors and 
supplemented with other researchers’ work. Figure 10 depicts the researchers’ three-factor 
trust model. The trust factors are broadly classified as (1) human-related, (2) partner-
related, and (3) environment-related. 
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Figure 10. Three-factor Trust Model. Adapted from Schaefer et al. (2016). 
a. Humans-Related Factors of Trust   
The study of trust between humans and machines should begin with human-related 
factors. Arguably, the character and the nature of the human operator could potentially 
exert the most significant influence on the overall performance of the system (Schaefer et 
al. 2016). The factors associated with humans are (a) human traits, (b) states, (c) cognitive 
factors, and (d) emotive factors.  
(1) Traits  
Humans’ traits and the demographic characteristics they are exposed to can affect 
how they interact with automated systems. These traits consist of age, gender, ethnicity, 
and personality. However, it was found out that there was no consistent relationship across 
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different studies. The link was discovered to be context-specific and to change depending 
on the parameters of the automated task (Szalma and Taylor 2011).   
• Age – According to studies, elderly persons appear to rely more on automation 
than younger adults. As a result, they are more relaxed with AI systems (Ho, 
Wheatley, and Scialfa 2005). It was also discovered that older persons trust 
automation more because of age-related cognitive deficiencies, which decrease 
their ability to detect automation flaws (Pak, Rovira, McLaughlin, and Baldwin 
2017). Older adults welcomed automation and were more willing to off-load 
tasks to automation as it allowed them freedom in their work, regardless of the 
reliability of the automation (Soeters, Winslow, and Weibull 2006). For 
instance, studies on vehicle automation and decision aids indicate that older 
adults trust automation more as compared to younger adults (Donmez et al. 
2006; Ho, Wheatley, and Scialfa 2005). However, these results were only 
limited to these specific contexts and may not be true for all cases.  
 
• Gender, Ethnicity, Personality and Trust Propensity – These factors have been 
discussed elsewhere (Schaefer 2013; Schaefer et al. 2016). However, there are 
currently limited study on these factors in the automation/AI literature. These 
factors which are also beyond the scope of this thesis will be excluded from 
further analysis.  
(2) States 
The relationships between human states such as attentional control, fatigue and 
stress levels, and automation are comparatively well-researched areas of HMI. These 
factors all have an influence on the trust development between humans and the AI system.  
• Attentional Control – Attentional control is defined as the ability of a person to 
pick what he pays attention (concentrates on) and what he ignores (Schaefer et 
al. 2016). Multiple studies indicated that human operators who exhibited lower 
attentional control interacted in a different way with an automated system. They 
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also relied more heavily on the automated system as compared to those with 
higher attentional control (Chen and Terrence 2009; Chen and Barnes 2012).  
 
• Fatigue – Fatigue can be categorized into active and passive fatigue. Active 
fatigue is a stress-like state due to mental overload while passive fatigue is a 
result of underload and monotony. Existing research seems to suggest that 
fatigue leads to over-dependence on automation even though there are differing 
perspectives on the effects of active and passive fatigue (Matthews et al. 2019). 
Regrettably, the limited literature studies provide conflicting results. For 
instance, Reichenbach, Onnasch, and Manzey (2011) found out that contrary to 
what was suggested earlier, sleep-deprived (active fatigue) operators were more 
attentive towards possible automation errors and failures and showed less over-
dependence. Operators who worked with a lack of sleep interacted more 
cautiously and intently with the decision aids and invested more time and 
attention to check the system COA and recommendations before approving it.  
 
Over-trust and under-trust that contribute to over-reliance and under-
dependence of the system may worsen performance (Lee and See 2004). When 
a human operator experiences high cognitive workloads, active fatigue may 
worsen over-trust issues, especially if the task requires the operator’s vigilance. 
When automation was designed to remove some workload burden from the 
human operator, fatigued operators may become dependent on the system and 
susceptible to delegate excessive tasks responsibility to it, minimizing his 
cognitive demand. Hence, in situations that require a high cognitive workload, 
there is motivation to off-load some tasks functions to automation.  
 
• Stress – In this thesis, stress is assumed to be induced by the operational tasks. 
Research has suggested that stress is dynamic and can lead to a decrement in 
trust (Schaefer and Scribner 2015). Biros, Daly, and Gunsch (2004) found that 
high task loads will lead to high stress and negative impact on human trust in 
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automation. However, it was also found out that during times of increased task 
loads, operators may resort to using system automation even though they have 
lower perceived trust in the system’s automation. However, this is not 
universally true. In cases where the tasks are allocated effectively between 
humans and automation, an increase in task load will not degrade the trust and 
overall performance. Many times, the loss of SA due to inefficient automation 
monitoring results in performance decrements and a declining understanding of 
the work environment which decreases trust (Cosenzo et al. 2006).  
(3) Cognitive Factors  
The cognitive factors considered in this work include an operator’s 
understandability of automation, and ability to use the system and expectation of the 
automation (Schaefer et al. 2016).  
• Understanding how the automation work – The ease with which the human 
operators can learn to operate and engage with the automation determines how 
well they understand the automation. Past experience with similar automation 
systems also leads to understanding (Schaefer et al. 2016). Several studies show 
that trust develops over time, and previous encounters with similar technologies 
or systems have an influence on trust development (Merritt and Ilgen 2008; 
Rajaonah et al. 2008). However, the relationship between ease of learning and 
trust is not so clear. On one hand, Wang, Jamieson, and Hollands (2011) 
suggested that ease of learning was negatively correlated to trust. On the other 
hand, researchers have also found that operator’s trust increases with training 
(Muir and Moray 1996). A study was done by Soeters, Winslow, and Weibull 
(2006) discovered that military cadets trusted information automation far more 
than decision automation. Decision automation becomes less explicit and more 
abstract as it replaces higher-order thinking skills like decision-making. The 
lack of transparency is a result of the complex computational algorithms and 
complicated sensor data fusion.  
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• Ability to use – The operator’s efficacy, workload, and competence all 
influence the “ability to use” of automated systems. Automation is frequently 
adopted to help humans to reduce their workload. It has been found that 
automation is effective in reducing both human physical and mental workload 
(Schaefer et al. 2016). In a study on combat identification tasks, Wang, 
Jamieson, and Hollands (2011) found that trust decreases if the automated 
systems result in an increase in cognitive workload. Moreover, the mental 
workload has a direct relationship with expertise with automation. Increased 
competence with an automated system, for example, often enhances trust 
development (Rajaonah, Anceaux, and Vienne 2006). However, more expertise 
may diminish a human’s capacity to watch for unexpected states in highly 
dependable automation systems (Bailey et al. 2006).  
 
• Expectation – The expectancy of the automation system is influenced by a 
person’s mental model of the system, its perceived usefulness, expectations, its 
reputation, and the perceived advantages of the system. The perceived 
usefulness of an automation system is frequently judged based on its function. 
The perceived benefits of the automation system will affect whether it will be 
trusted (Lees and Lee 2007). Moreover, the reputation of an automated system 
may influence the human operator’s expectations of the system. Generally, 
there will be more trust when the system is known to have a positive reputation 
(de Vries and Midden 2008).  
(4) Emotive Factors  
Emotive factors considered in this work include attitudes toward automation, 
commitment to, and comfort with automation.  
 
• Attitude toward automation – The attitude toward automation affects the overall 
awareness of system behavior. It was found that positive attitudes such as the 
happiness of an automation system affect trust, reliance, and over-reliance on 
the system (Bailey et al. 2006; Schaefer et al. 2016). On the contrary, errors or 
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difficult-to-use systems frequently give rise to negative attitudes (Ardern-Jones 
et al. 2009) and result in disuse (Gao, Lee, and Zhang 2006).  
 
• Commitment – In the literature, commitment is often studied in terms of feeling 
satisfaction or delight. Research has shown that human satisfaction influences 
the human operator’s view of automation in many applications. For instance, 
satisfaction has been demonstrated to improve trust development with combat 
identification (Wang, Jamieson, and Hollands 2011) and vehicle automation 
(Donmez et al. 2006).  
 
• Comfort – Comfort of using a system can influence a human’s perception of 
the system and can ultimately affect trust. It was found that the operator’s 
familiarity with and closeness to the system influence the level of the operator’s 
comfort with automation (Schaefer et al. 2016). However, there has not been a 
conclusive relationship between comfort and trust and more investigation is 
required. 
b. Partner-Related Factors of Trust   
The “partner” in this study refers to an automated system that works alongside the 
human as a teammate. Schaefer et al. (2016) and Hancock, Billings, and Schaefer (2011) 
hypothesized that the human-robot trust is moderated by the features and capabilities of the 
automation system.  
(1) Features 
The features of the AI system are important factors in the trust development 
between humans and the AI system. In this work, these features include mode of 
automation, appearance/anthropomorphism, and level of automation (LOA).  
• Mode of Automation – The mode of automation includes fixed, adjustable, and 
adaptive. Generally, humans exhibit greater trust in AI systems when there is 
some degree of collaboration with the system. For instance, it was found that 
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humans generally have greater trust in AI systems with manually adjustable 
automation where humans have explicit control of the system, compared to 
implicit control (Moray, Inagaki, and Itoh 2000; Sauer, Nickel, and Wastell 
2013).  
 
• Appearance – The appearance of the automated system has been shown to 
influence automation appeal and use (Li and Yeh 2010). Pak et al. (2012) 
demonstrated that higher levels of human-like characteristics significantly 
enhanced trust development in complex systems. The physical form of the AI 
system should meet the human’s expectations required for specific functions 
(Schaefer et al. 2016).  
 
• LOA – The LOA refers to the amount of control or level of autonomy the AI 
system is designed to exercise (Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens 2000). In 
general, no direct relationship has been demonstrated between trust and LOA. 
However, it has been demonstrated that when humans perceive an automated 
system to be “good,” they are more likely to trust it than when they believe it to 
be “bad” (Merritt et al. 2013). Thus, it is crucial to appropriately design the 
LOA to perform the required function in helping the human operator to perform 
his work.  
(2) Capabilities 
One of the more significant influences on human-automation trust has been found 
to be an automated system’s capabilities. For instance, the consistency and reliability of an 
automated system over time is one of the most conclusive criteria that have been explored 
to increase trust in automation systems (Schaefer et al. 2016). Further investigation into 
the topic of system consistency and reliability reveals the importance of system feedback 
and error reduction in enhancing confidence. Three important factors of system behavior, 
reliability, and feedback that define a system’s capability are discussed in this section.  
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• Behavior – A system’s behaviors should be predictable and dependable to 
positively influence trust development sustenance. A predictable system refers 
to a system that matches its operator’s expectations. A dependable system refers 
to a system that is consistent and effective in performing the allocated functions. 
Operators will begin and continue to trust a system if the experience with the 
system provides predictable outcomes (Cahour and Forzy 2009; Muir 1994). 
However, there will be a drastic drop in trust which will result in disuse or 
disregard of the system when the operator experiences unanticipated reactions 
from the system (Schaefer et al. 2016). Hence, consistent and effective system 
behavior and actions are desired (Yamada and Kuchar 2006). Tenney, Rogers, 
and Pew (1998) observed that pilots prefer dependable automation that provides 
information that is both simple and informative.  
 
For automated systems that provide alarms to users, the frequency and duration 
of the alarm affect trust development. In a study on collision avoidance systems, 
Gupta, Bisantz, and Singh (2002) observed that a reduced number of alarms 
resulted in higher trust. Disproportionately more alarms raised the levels of 
false alerts and were seen as unnecessary (Wickens et al. 2009).  
 
• Reliability/Errors – Reliable systems have been shown to engender trust across 
different task contexts (Schaefer et al. 2016). Despite the fact that faults do 
occur in systems, the ability to reduce all types of errors boosts the system’s 
reliability, which helps trust formation. (de Vries, Midden, and Bouwhuis 
2003). On the other hand, it was discovered that a high miss rate and a high 
number of alarms erode trust and worsen performance (Wickens et al. 2009; 
Yamada and Kuchar 2006). Furthermore, a study has shown that the task 
difficulty level, rather than the type of error, appears to determine the level of 
trust. In an identification task scenario, Madhavan and Wiegmann (2007) found 
that trust decreases when automated systems fail or cause false alarms while 
identifying a target that the operator believes is easily identifiable. However, 
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trust develops when the automation finds a target that the operator believes is 
difficult to identify. 
 
In a study conducted by Soeters, Winslow, and Weibull (2006) on trust and 
reliability, they found that trust in automated systems formed by military cadets 
and older adults is generally insensitive to the system’s reliability. Trust for this 
demographic remained relatively high even though the AI reliability was 
perceived to be lower. This observation was supported by another study which 
also found trust to be insensitive to reliability for a group of civilian students 
performing military tasks (Rovira, McGarry, and Parasuraman 2007). The 
military cadets’ lack of sensitivity to reliability could be explained by the fact 
that they treat AI as a teammate and are influenced by the military 
organizational culture, which requires authority and comrades to be trusted. 
(Pak, Rovira, McLaughlin, and Baldwin 2017).  
 
• Feedback/Cueing – Research showed that the appropriateness of a system’s 
feedback and cues directly affect trust development (Schaefer et al. 2016). 
Examples of this include the following:   
o Quantity of feedback (Muir and Moray 1996) 
o Information Accessibility (Bitan and Meyer 2007) 
o Type of feedback (Wiegmann et al. 2006) 
o Feedback accuracy and truthfulness (Sharples et al. 2007; Spain and 
Bliss 2008) 
o Effective communication to minimize conflicting information to 
operator (Stanton, Young, and Walker 2007; Song and Kuchar 2003) 
c. Environment-Related Factors of Trust   
In addition to factors relating to humans and AI systems, the operational 
environment that the system is operating in also affects trust development. Hancock et al. 
(2011) identified environment-related trust elements in terms of team collaboration and 
task/context. 
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(1) Team Collaboration  
Team collaboration has become a highly researched topic in the realm of HMI as 
automated systems become more advanced with higher levels of autonomy. A review of 
the literature on team collaboration between humans and automation systems suggests the 
importance of cultural/societal impact and mental models.  
• Cultural/Societal Impact – The society and culture that the operator is exposed 
to, impact trust development. The community, culture, health and well-being, 
environment, political system, and anxieties and ambitions about safety and the 
future all have societal consequences. (Clavell and Frowd 2014). A person’s 
society creates a set of cultural norms that affects one’s acceptance of an 
automated system (Huerta, Glandon, and Petrides 2012). Societal factors 
impact individual’s mental models of automation. 
 
An example is a military culture and its impact on trust development in 
automated systems (Soeters, Winslow, and Weibull 2006). The military culture 
is hierarchical, with strong social orders that adhere to laws and regulations 
while maintaining strict discipline. Military culture and the training that soldiers 
undergo can affect soldiers’ expectations and behaviors with AI systems 
(Kennedy, Sibley, and Coyne 2015). Soldiers are likely to regard AI systems as 
comrades. Because of the AI system’s teammate attitude, soldiers may initially 
have unreasonable expectations of the AI system’s capability. (Soeters, 
Winslow, and Weibull 2006).  
 
• Mental Models – The mental model of an automation system that an operator 
has can be influenced by societal impact, prior encounters with similar systems, 
cultural beliefs, and prejudices. System feedback can also be designed to update 
an operator’s mental model of the system (Cuevas et al. 2007). Individual and 
collective mental models are structured pieces of knowledge that humans have 
that define and forecast the objective, form, function, or state of a system. 
(Rouse and Morris 1986). The mental model is discussed under environmental 
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factors as it is discussed at the society level instead of at the individual level. 
Mental models have been shown to have both direct and indirect influences on 
trust development. For instance, Fogg and Tseng (1999) found that if a design 
interface of a system matches the operator’s mental model, the operator will 
perceive the system as credible and thus trust the system more. Also, Soeters, 
Winslow, and Weibull (2006) discovered that military cadets are more likely to 
dislike a system because of previous experiences with similar systems that 
resulted in terrible repercussions. (Pak, Rovira, McLaughlin, and Baldwin 
2017). Other research also suggests an indirect relationship between the mental 
model and trust. Research on cockpit displays (Sarter, Woods, and Billings 
1997) and driving automation (Walker, Stanton, and Young 2001) found that 
mental models are associated with reduced attention allocation of task elements. 
This will degrade the situation awareness of the operator which in turn 
decreases trust development in automation.  
(2) Task/Context 
According to human-automation trust research, risk and uncertainty are essential 
components in the formation of trust. 
• Risk/Uncertainty – Risk can develop from both internal such as data corruption 
and external sources. Risk directly influences the evaluation of system safely 
which affects trust (Lin, Bekey, and Abney 2008).  
 
• Context/Task type – The many task and function components of automation are 
critical in establishing trust in these systems. This section delves into three 
major areas of automation: cognitive assistance, control aids, and perceptual 
aids (Schaefer et al. 2016).  
o Cognitive aids strive to reduce the cognitive effort of humans by making 
recommendations concerning current and probable future conditions. 
During monitoring, these aids can perform accurate identifications or 
detections. Research has shown that transparency, reliability, operator’s 
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experience, age, task difficulty, and risk have impacts on trust. For 
example, as previously noted, a reliable and dependable system fosters 
greater trust. Similarly, a transparent decision aid also contributes to 
higher trust (Mercado et al. 2016). In a study on using automated aid for 
inspection tasks, Madhavan and Wiegmann (2007) discovered that more 
experienced operators trust an automated aid more than less experienced 
operators. In addition, Ezer, Fisk, and Rogers (2008) found that older 
people tend to trust cognitive aids more than younger people. 
 
o The goal of control aids is to replace certain degrees of human work, 
such as navigation and vehicle control. Trust in these aids is generally 
high and the default trust on these systems tends to be higher than a 
human aid (Ma and Kaber 2007). Like cognitive aids, the reliability of 
control aids was proven to have considerable influence on trust. Higher 
reliability has been shown to contribute to greater trust in fault 
management systems and patient monitoring systems (Moray, Inagaki, 
and Itoh 2000; Spain and Bliss 2008). In addition, older persons were 
found to have more faith in driver mitigation technologies than younger 
adults (Donmez et al. 2006). Additionally, this research also revealed 
that communication played an important role. Humans showed more 
trust when the systems provided accurate and reliable information and 
used human speech. Last, in the context of a vehicle control system, 
trust improved when the system reduced human workload and was 
perceived as useful (Donmez et al. 2006; Spain and Bliss 2008).  
 
o Perceptual aids help operators by providing alerts/alarms or by assisting 
with pattern recognition. A study has shown that drivers demonstrated 
a higher level of trust in alarms with a low sensitivity rate (Gupta, 
Bisantz, and Singh 2002). Additionally, the alarms should be prompt to 
alert the operator (Abe and Richardson 2006). Reliability was found to 
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be an important factor for trust. Last, it was also found out that 
explainability and understandability of what and how the system is 
doing led to higher trust (Koustanaï et al. 2012; Gunning and Aha 2019). 
For instance, Gunning and Aha (2019) found that users prefer 
explanations, even if they lower performance.  
2. Objective/Subjective Factors of Trust and Trustworthiness 
Sheridan (2019) studied the factors of trust and trustworthiness of automated 
systems and categorized them into objective and subjective factors. In his earlier work, 
Sheridan (1988) emphasized the significance of trust in military Command and Control 
(C2) systems. He then proposed seven objective attributes as summarized in Table 7. 
Objective attributes are measurements that can be measured objectively, in a way that 
operational measures of efficacy or performance may be obtained to characterize the 
system’s level of trust. The factors are categorized into two groups: the trustworthiness of 
the system and the trust attributes of the operator. Sheridan (2019) asserted that it is 
important to differentiate between these two groups of factors that are frequently 
misunderstood.  
Table 7. Objective Factors of Trust/Trustworthiness. Adapted from 
Sheridan (1988).  
S/N Objective Factors Description 
Group I - System’s Trustworthiness: Properties of the System 
1 Reliability Low automation error rate 
2 Usefulness The automation’s ability to do what is most important 
3 Robustness The automation’s capability and flexibility in performing a wide variety of task 
4 Understandability/ Explainability 
Automation transparency in exposing the reasons and 
processes of what it does 
5 Explication of intent What automation will do next is communicated to the user. 
Group II - User’s Factors: Trust attributes of the operator 
6 Familiarity Whether operator has prior experience with the system or similar system 
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7 Dependence 
The extent to which the user would employ the 
automation system in comparison to other methods of 
performing the specified task 
 
A decade later, Sheridan (2019) presented a more comprehensive list of factors 
influencing trust development. Automation, without a doubt, has become more powerful 
and clever in terms of what it can do for us, as well as more varied and less predictable in 
many respects. It is becoming increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to comprehend how 
automation makes decisions and takes acts. Therefore, Sheridan (2019) asserted that as 
these systems become more intelligent or “human-like,” more subjective factors related to 
human characteristics and morality will be relevant and the knowledge of these factors will 
be useful. As such, a set of subjective factors is summarized in Table 8, has been included 
to form a more comprehensive list in his study of trust in automation. 
Table 8. Subjective Factors of Trust/Trustworthiness. Adapted from 
Sheridan (2019).  
S/N Subjective Factors Description 
1 Care 
The extent to which the system cares about its user after 
considering the work objectives, user’s ability, and 
restrictions in overseeing the automation. For example, 
it will consider the user’s response time, preferences, and 
programming faults, among other things. 
2 Liberty 
The automation is adaptable enough to allow the user to 
program in a variety of ways, as well as providing 
alternative displays and interaction/control options 
centred around user’s preferences. In addition, the 
system remains resilient even when the user commits 
procedural mistakes. It offers advises on how to repair 
problems and make the contact easier. 
3 Fairness 
The automation is consistent, and the operator will not 
be required to operate with greater speed, expertise, or 
programming skill than is expected. It will notify the 
operator if a request or instruction is beyond the 
automation’s comprehension or competence. It will not 
take measures that contradict the operator’s apparent 
objectives until safety is jeopardized. In the latter case, 
the system will provide the rationale for deviation. 
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S/N Subjective Factors Description 
4 Loyalty 
The automation will keep a record of its interactions with 
the operator to behave as desired by user. It will 
anticipate user needs as much as feasible and be prepared 
to act when called upon by the user.  
5 Authority 
The automation will carry out the specified actions and 
decisions based upon knowledge base of the allocated 
task. It will optimize its decisions and actions based on 
speed, accuracy, and resources while keeping the 
operator’s goals in mind. Otherwise, it will operate with 
clear default aims. 
6 Sanctity  
The automation will present easily understood visual 
display and vocal messages to the user. The level of 
feedback desired by the user will be supplied. Such 
communication will be orderly and direct. 
 
3. Denning’s Six-User level (subjective) Software Quality Assessment  
As automation systems become increasingly complex, intelligent, and “human-
like,” researchers’ focus has switched to investigating subjective aspects, such as emotive 
components, to better understand the dynamics between humans and automation systems. 
For instance, Denning (2016) asserted that software quality evaluation has shifted from 
traditional objective yardsticks of correctness, reliability, and usability to user-level 
assessment. The objective measures gave an assessment of the software’s objective 
properties. However, as Shewhart (1931) noted that the quality of a product is ultimately a 
subjective assessment made by the users reacting to it. Many software today fall short of 
the objective international standard ISO 9216 but are still widely adopted and trusted upon 
(Denning 2016). Denning (2016) developed a six-user level software quality evaluation to 
address software quality from the user’s perspective by addressing fundamental questions 
such as “Does this software aid me in my work?” and “Can I rely on it?” The six user-level 
software quality assessment framework is summarized in Table 9. In Denning’s (2016) 
model, the highest value obtainable is four where users are satisfied with the software as 
that the software has indeed been useful to the users. Also, there is an element of human 
acceptance and a sense of “Care” from the system which were what Sheridan (2019) had 
argued for. Although Denning’s work was on a generic software system, the ideas could 
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also be applied to automation or autonomous systems (Hawkley, Mares, and Giammanco 
2005). 
Table 9. Denning’s Six-User Level Software Quality Assessment. Adapted 
from Denning (2016).  
Levels Software Quality 
Assessments 
Remark 
4 Software delights Users are satisfied with the software as it performs 
beyond expectations. It produces new and 
unexpected positive effects to the users’ work. The 
users feel that the producer understands the users’ 
environment and the software is designed 
specifically for the user to solve problems. 
3 Software produces 
no negative 
consequences 
After utilizing the program for a while, users have 
had no service disruptions. Users recognize that 
software has been carefully thought out since it is 
secure against vulnerabilities and offers functionality 
that the user did not request but will assist the user in 
avoiding unfavorable future problems. 
2 Software fits 
environment 
Users can use the software with ease, and it fits the 
context that the users are operating in. This means 
that users do not experience steep learning curve in 
adopting this software and the use of this software 
directly helps the users to get work done.  
1 Software fulfils all 
basic promises 
Users assess that the software meets the standard 
requirements. The objective ISO standard facilitate 
this level of assessment.  
0 Some trust, 
begrudging use, 
cynical satisfaction 
Users have enough trust in the software to utilize it 
willingly. Many pieces of software were published 
with bugs and security flaws, and many were only 
fixed after users complained. 
-1 No trust Users do not trust the software as there are software 
bugs, malware resulting in system crash. 
 
Denning (2016) designed levels to illustrate the software’s varying emphasis on 
user pleasure. The greatest level—“delight”—climbs to the top level because of the user-
producer interaction. A satisfied user will state that the producer understood the user’s 
work and environment to design a user-centric software. Also, the producer is available to 
assist in user’s problems and to seize opportunities and care for the user.  
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E. TRUST REPAIR FACTORS IN AI SYSTEMS 
This section reviews the literature on trust repair models and trust repair factors. 
Figure 11 summarizes the trust repair model proposed by de Visser, Pak and Shaw (2018) 
and Schaefer et al. (2017). It involves three main stages: (1) Relationship Act, (2) 
Relationship Regulation Act, and (3) Net Victim Effect.  
 
Figure 11. Trust Repair Model. Source: de Visser, Pak, and Shaw (2018).  
1. Relationship Act 
The cycle of trust repair starts with a relationship act performed by the autonomous 
system (de Visser, Pak and Shaw 2018). This relationship act can be beneficial or costly. 
Beneficial acts are those that people perceive as pleasant interactions. Examples of these 
include good, intended performance, politeness, and demonstration of algorithm 
capabilities. These positive activities can also serve as a general relationship mechanism, 
increasing credibility, goodwill, and forgiveness. On the other hand, costly acts are those 
acts that humans perceive to be harmful to trust. Examples of these acts are time loss, 
damage, inefficiency, miscommunications, and errors.  
49 
2. Relationship Regulation Act 
A relationship regulation act is a corrective action taken immediately or after 
relationship activities (de Visser, Pak and Shaw 2018). The authors claimed that this 
regulation act is crucial for maintaining good and long-lasting relationships. Gottman and 
Levenson (1992) classified hypothetical regulating activities into two categories: repair and 
dampening acts. Repair activities reduce the negative effects of a costly act, whereas 
dampening measures reduce the impact of a favorable deed. Healthy partnerships 
necessitate these two types of activity. 
3. Net Victim Effect  
Researchers de Visser, Pak, and Shaw (2018) defined net victim effects as the 
combined effects of a costly and repair act or a beneficial and dampening act on human 
perception and experience. The authors also argued that each human will experience 
different impacts as individual differences affect trust. As a result, there is a need to 
incorporate this feature into the trust repair model because individual variances in readiness 
to resolve and rebuild the relationship may exist. 
4. Repair Strategies  
Table 10 provides an overview of the types and descriptions of trust repair studies 
conducted by different researchers. This table provides an example of many types of repair 
acts.  
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It should be noted, however, that in the case of more complicated automated 
systems, basic notices or explanations may be insufficient to restore trust. As a result, when 
automated systems fail, deliberate actions must be taken to restore trust. The method must 
respond appropriately to the kind and severity of the trust violation and scenario. It is 
challenging for a system designer to find the appropriate trust repair activities due to the 
wide range of possible responses and dynamic parameters. It is yet too early to propose 
definitive solutions to this problem because research is still ongoing. de-Visser, Pak, and 
Shaw (2018) offered some general guidelines to automated system designers based on 
literature studies as follows:   
First, there is no such thing as a one-size-fits-all trust repair technique that can be 
applied to every system. Because of variances in cognitive abilities, personality, 
experience, humans have the tendency to respond to apologies in a variety of ways. 
Second, the trust restoration approach should be precisely matched to the type of 
trust violation by the autonomous system designer. de-Visser, Pak, and Shaw (2018), for 
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example, proposed that when an automated system commits a competency-based failure, 
such as a malfunction or output mistakes, any trust repair act is preferable to none. 
Third, the context, which includes the surroundings and the precise situation of trust 
violation, should be investigated and comprehended. According to research, context 
influences how humans understand and respond to automation failure (Hoff and Bashir 
2015a; Mittu et al. 2016). Furthermore, the degrees of risk associated with operations have 
a substantial impact on trust repair (Satterfield et al. 2017). 
Fourth, the timing of a repair act is critical. According to a current study, 
apologizing at the next decision point for people is more effective than apologizing 
immediately after the trust violation in maintaining confidence. One possible reason is that 
humans do not remember the apology, but rather digest the information when it is important 
to their immediate action. The system will then require a model that detects trust violations 
precisely and alerts the user the next time a decision must be taken. 
Finally, for effectiveness, automated system designers should examine the 
frequency of the trust restoration actions and the variability in communication (de-Visser, 
Pak, and Shaw (2018). Variability in how the trust-repair act is communicated or the source 
of the problem is revealed may result in greater success. Also, multiple apologies on the 
same problem without a change in system behaviors may reflect poorly on the system and 
make the system “insincere”—unwilling to change. 
F. KEY TAKEAWAYS FROM CHAPTER II 
This section summarizes the key points of Chapter II. These pointers will be useful 
for Chapter IV and V of this thesis.  
(1) Summary from the Review of Trust Definitions 
In the review of trust definitions, the concept of default trust is useful in the study 
of this thesis, as operators are likely to have been trained or operated with similar systems 
that may shape his/her impression of the AI-AMD system. As such, there is a need to 
investigate if default trust applies to the AI-AMD system in a military context.  
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Second, the definition of trust adopted in this thesis is “an attitude that AI-AMD 
system agent will help to achieve the operator’s goals in a situation characterized by 
uncertainty and vulnerability.” Trust is crucial in AMD operations as a high level of trust 
reduces uncertainty by anticipating the impacts of certain behaviors that make it easier for 
humans to work alongside AI-AMD systems in achieving missions.  
Third, the concept of contractual trust states that trust exists if the AI-AMD system 
adheres to a specific contract. In this thesis, contracts refer to specific functions and 
behaviors that the AI-AMD is supposed to carry out. 
Fourth, trust repair will be considered, which is defined as the act of improving 
trust after a trust violation has happened. Trust violations are inevitable as no system 
developed will ever be perfect. Hence, measures to address trust violations should be 
explored to maintain trust.  
Fifth, it is noteworthy to point out that trust is different from being trustworthy. A 
system can be designed to be trustworthy but that does not guarantee that it will gain trust 
from its operator. However, a system must be trustworthy first for warranted trust to 
develop. Hence, this indicates the need to explore factors from two perspectives: the human 
operators and the system. 
Last, in the review of trust calibration and trust specificity, the concepts of over-
trust and distrust were discussed. Mismatches between humans’ trust and system 
capabilities will result in undesirable consequences. While it is important to develop 
human-AI trust, the concept of over-trust, which leads to over-reliance suggests that there 
must be mechanisms in place to keep trust at the desired level. 
(2) Summary from the Review of HMI 
The four stages of activities in describing an HMI would allow designers to identify 
factors that can lead to a relationship with trust between an operator and a future AI-AMD 
system. The system design considerations reviewed are also useful in identifying the 
factors that are relevant in improving the relationship between human operators and future 
AI-AMD systems.  
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The deep dive into the study of the “selecting an action” stage of HMI, refines the 
human information processing steps. Mapping these steps into system functions allows 
designers to describe the interactions between humans and AI-AMD systems with more 
granularity. Relevant trust factors that influence these human information processing step 
system functions can be identified to improve trust. 
Pritchett and Feary’s (2011) work on the constructs of effective HMI provide 
valuable insights to improve the interactions between humans and system. For instance, 
the construct of representations is crucial, as the inputs and outputs of systems must be 
readable and understandable for humans to achieve effective interactions. These are 
building blocks for creating trusting relationships.  
Another takeaway from this review is that interactions between humans and 
automated systems encompass a variety of tasks. This differentiation of tasks is referred to 
as function specificity by Lee and See (2004), in which humans interact with specific 
functions rather than the complete system. If a particular function was deemed 
untrustworthy, this could cause the human to distrust the entire system (Abbass 2019). As 
such, effective functional allocation to manage connections should be designed to enable 
trustworthy human-AI interaction.  
(3) Summary from the Review of Trust Factors 
On top of the traditional objective factors associated with systems, the extensive 
review of trust factors in the literature suggests the increasing importance of human-related 
(subjective) factors on trust. This indicates that trust is a psychological construct and that 
humans are ultimately accountable for the success or failure of operations. As a result, there 
is a need to sufficiently study and describe the HMI to identify the aspects that are relevant 
to human-AI trust. 
Second, the review suggests that context, or the environment in which the human 
and system are operating, is crucial in determining the establishment of trust. As such, 
attention will be given to describe the environment where the HMI is taking place. 
Thereafter, with the environment being defined, the associated factors can be identified.  
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(4) Summary from the Review of Trust Repair Factors 
In the trust repair model presented, it highlighted the importance of keeping the 
trust level at optimum level. This reinforces the need to prevent over-trust which leads to 
over-reliance and distrust which leads to disuse. Also, the potential trust repair strategy will 
be dynamic in nature which depends on the environment and situation. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW – OVERVIEW OF AI SYSTEMS 
FOR AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE 
This chapter presents the second part of the extensive literature review which 
analyzed the AMD threat scenarios and operations. Figure 12 shows the flow of Chapter 
III. First, this chapter reviewed the likely threats that an AI-AMD system would likely be 
contested with. With that, the threat scenarios from the RED force were postulated. 
Additionally, a possible threat from BLUE force to the successful AI-AMD operation was 
also considered to provide a holistic evaluation of trust in the latter part of the thesis.  
 
Figure 12. Schematic of the Flow of Chapter III. 
Next, the DoDAF operation viewpoints of the AI-AMD were adopted from Jones 
et al. (2020) and presented in this chapter. The AI-AMD kill-chain functions were also 
reviewed to describe the HMI of an AI-AMD system. The chapter concludes with an AMD 
case study on the U.S. Army Patriot System to provide further insights on the HMI and 
trust of an AI-AMD system.  
A. OVERVIEW OF AI-AMD THREAT SCENARIOS  
1. Specific Threats 
The U.S. military is expected to face wide-ranging threats from three main sources: 
(1) air threats, (2) ballistic missiles, and (3) rockets, artillery, and mortars (RAM) as 
prescribed in the Joint Publication (JP) 3–01 (Scott 2017).  
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• Air threats refer to manned and unmanned aircrafts and aerodynamic missiles.  
• Ballistic missiles are those that do not generate lift from aerodynamic surfaces 
and follow a ballistic trajectory towards a predetermined target.  
• RAMs are expedient, low-cost indirect fire means that have been typically 
employed against airbases, forward bases, and critical infrastructure.  
Jones et al. (2020) had earlier in their study considered AMD threats from missiles 
and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) for the application of AI on AMD systems. These 
threats and two other threats from manned aircrafts are compiled in Table 11. From Table 
11, two observations are made. First, AMD threats have become more complex and harder 
to destroy due to their increased operational range and velocity. Second, air missile threats 
are far more demanding than aircraft and UAVs due to the high velocity which translates 
to short response time.  
Table 11. Summary of AMD Threats. Adapted from Jones et al. (2020), 
Airforce-technology (2011) and Airforce-technology (2021). 
Specific Threats Operational Range (km) 
Velocity (km/
min) 
DF-21D Hypersonic (China) 12,000 205.80 
DF-17 Hypersonic (China) 2,500 205.80 
WZ-8 Drone (China) 6,000 82.32 
Chengdu J-20 (China) 3,400 35.00 
P-270 Moskit (Russia) 250 61.75 
BrahMos-11 (Russia) 600 144.07 
3M-54 Kalibr (Russia) 50 16.08 
Su-35 Multirole Fighter (Russia) 3,600 39.83 
Khaliij Fars (Iran) 300 61.73 
Shahed-129 Drone (Iran) 170 2.92 
 
2. AMD Threat Scenarios 
Two board categories of AMD threat scenarios from both the RED and BLUE 
perspectives were developed and discussed below. These threat scenarios indicate the need 
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for a high trust environment whereby the AMD operators could make decisions and 
respond to evolving threats promptly. Also, the methodology and training data used to 
develop the AI algorithm are important in building a trustworthy system in which the 
recommendations and actions are what operators would anticipate.  
a. Traditional Threat Scenarios 
First, traditional threat scenarios of missile threats of varying complexity towards 
the U.S. homeland were considered. These threats were further classified into three 
categories: 
• Low complexity Scenarios – Single conventional missile threat such as non-
hypersonic missile or fighter is the most common threat that the AMD 
encounters. The current AMD systems are equipped to deal with this threat as 
there is sufficient reaction time to destroy it because of lower velocity.  
 
• Medium complexity scenarios – Multiple conventional missiles and/or fighters 
may pose a significant threat to the AMD system as the adversary may want to 
increase the likelihood of kill by launching multiple missiles simultaneously. 
These threats post mid-level complexity to the AMD operators. The mental 
workload of the operators increases with multiple targets as the operators must 
execute all the kill-chain functions on all targets simultaneously.  
 
• High complexity scenarios – Advanced weaponry such as hypersonic missile is 
an emerging and complex threat to AMD. Hypersonic missile glides in the 
upper atmosphere and is highly maneuverable with a speed of at least five times 
the speed of sound (Mach 5). It can escape from the radar’s detection during its 
flight phase and only remain detectable at the terminal phase of flight when 
homing towards its targets. As such, the operator is left with little reaction time 
to respond to such a threat.  
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b. Incongruent AI-AMD Decision Aid Recommendations from Operator’s 
Concept of Operations (CONOPs) and Training, Tactics, and 
Procedures (TTPs) 
In a scenario where a ballistic missile is launched towards the U.S. homeland. The 
operators and U.S. AMD systems are on alert supporting homeland defense operations. 
However, the AI-AMD decision aid recommends an engagement that is different from the 
operator’s CONOPs and TTPs. This scenario creates a temporal trust deficit where the 
operator anticipates that the AI-AMD decision aid would propose a COA that is aligned to 
the operator would do. The operator will likely distrust the AI-AMD system and not adopt 
the recommendation. This scenario is analogous to the USS Vincennes incident where the 
Commanding Officer relied on his own judgement and took a different course of action.  
c. Inadequate Trust Resulting in Catastrophic Consequences 
The USS Vincennes incident highlighted that insufficient trust on the system 
outputs or recommendations may have dire consequences. The operators or commanders 
who ignore the system outputs may lose out on important information about the situation 
or environment. This may lower situational awareness. In situations where humans are 
unable to ascertain the information physically, this lack of trust and acceptance of system 
outputs may result in incorrect actions.  
d. Over-Trust Resulting in Over-Reliance 
On the other hand, operators who are over-reliant on the automated system may 
simply let the system run on automatic mode without checking its processes and outputs. 
The operator’s skill will degrade after a long period of over-reliance on the system. The 
operator will not be able to detect any errors or incorrect system outputs. Since an 
automated system is seldom perfect and coupled with a dynamic environment, this may 
result in dire consequences without humans actively involved in the decision-making and 
executions process.  
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B. OVERVIEW OF AI-AMD OPERATIONS AND ARCHITECTURE 
1. Operational Viewpoints and Scenarios 
As illustrated in the previous sections, the fielding of more technologically 
advanced aircrafts and missiles has widened the scope and complexity of AMD operations. 
The U.S. forces must remain capable to counter these threats. The AMD system remains 
critical in achieving this mission to deny the enemy freedom of action (Scott 2017).  
The AMD systems must then meet two key operational needs to counter these 
evolving threats. First, there is a need to shorten the operators’ response time to respond to 
complex scenarios comprising of multiple and fast-moving targets. Second, there is a need 
to improve the operators’ situational awareness (SA) by increasing the system surveillance 
range. To meet the requirement of improved SA, the AMD system is often part of a system-
of-systems network where target information is shared amongst many systems. This allows 
the AMD operator to be able to “see” targets that are beyond its inherent detection range 
and prepare for tracking and engagement, if necessary.  
An AI-AMD system would bridge the current capability gaps. An AI decision aid 
would allow for rapid information sharing across sensor platforms to increase SA. Within 
the AMD system, an in-built AI decision aid would reduce the operator’s mental workload 
by providing recommendations that greatly reduces response time. In an earlier study by 
Jones et al. (2020), a model-based systems engineering (MBSE) architecture based on the 
DOD architecture framework (DoDAF) for an AI-AMD system was developed. The 
authors demonstrated that an increased level of automation of an AMD system significantly 
reduces the execution time to engage a target. The architecture frameworks developed by 
them will be reviewed in the following sections.  
a. DoDAF OV-1: High Level Operational Concept 
Figure 13 shows the high-level operational concept of an AI-AMD system. Boyd’s 
concept of observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop was adopted to analyze the AMD 
operations (Blaha 2018). The OV-1 depicts that the AI-AMD system is part of a larger 
systems-of-system network of sensors, weapon platforms. The AI will enhance the 
operator’s ability to “observe” and “orient” as information is shared across platforms and 
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organized for ease of understanding. Within the AMD system, the AI will also process this 
information quickly and automatically to provide the operators with a recommended course 
of actions to “decide” and “act” fast. As such, the OODA loop of AMD operations will be 
shortened with AI.  
 
Figure 13. OV-1 of AMD Operations  
b. DoDAF OV-6c: Operational Scenarios  
Jones et al. (2020) developed an OV-6c (Event Trace Description) to illustrate the 
AMD operational scenario as depicted in OV-1. Figure 14 gives the OV-6c operational 
scenario that is based on JP 3-60 Joint Targeting. The OV-6c depicts the agents (AI-AMD 
decision aid, blue forces, red threat, sensors, and network) and their actions in an AMD 
scenario. Jones et al. (2020) selected a generic AMD threat scenario of a single AMD threat 
(hostile aircraft, UAV, or missile) and defined the sequence of actions that each agent 
undertakes in a typical AMD operation. The scenario is intended to be generic enough to 




A typical AMD operation is as follows:  
• It begins with a red threat launching an attack against BLUEFORCE 
(BLUFOR) assets.  
• BLUFOR are unaware of the attack until the BLUFOR sensors detect it.  
• Sensors send the detection data to the AI-AMD decision aid through a 
network.  
• AI-AMD decision aid requests for more information from the BLUFOR 
sensors through the network.  
• Sensors send their updated detection information back to the AI-AMD 
decision aid.  
• AI-AMD confirms a valid target detection and requests the BLUFOR 
sensors to track a target.  
• AI-AMD determines available BLUFOR assets for engagement and 
checks that there are no friendly forces within the area of operations and 
requests status and location of known forces.  
• Once the AI-AMD de-conflicts the area, it issues orders through the 
network along with fire command to the BLUFOR attack mechanism.  
• BLUFOR engage the threat, followed by an assessment of the 
engagement.  
• If the red threat has not been destroyed, the AI-AMD can re-issue an 
attack command, and the BLUFOR engage again.  
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Figure 14. OV-6c: AI-AMD Event Trace for AMD Operations. Source: Jones 
et al. (2020).  
63 
c. DoDAF OV-5a: Operational Activity Decomposition Tree 
Jones et al. (2020) identified 17 critical functions for the AI-enabled AMD system 
as outlined in the JP 3-60 process. Jones et al. (2020) streamlined these functions of the 
AI-enabled AMD system to higher-level functions from the JP 3-60 find, fix, track, target, 
engage, assess (F2T2EA) kill-chain as shown in Table 12. The F2T2EA processes were 
further streamlined to the OODA loop. Jones et al. (2020) further developed OV-5a, an 
activity decomposition tree that depicts the operational scenario from the OV-6c in a 
hierarchical function diagram. Figure 15 shows the internal capabilities decomposition of 
the AI-AMD system and Figure 16 shows the external system decomposition. The OV-5a 
depicted in Figure 16 defines the relationships and interactions the AI-AMD has with the 
external agents within the System-of-Systems (SoS) (i.e., BLUFOR sensors, weapons, and 
network) as well as the REDFOR threat.  
Table 12. Mapping of Critical Functions to F2T2EA and OODA Loop 




Accept Initial Detection 
Identify Emerging Target 
Fix 





Requested Updated Target Track 
Validate Target 
Assess Blue Proximity 
Decide Target 
Nominate Engagement Options 
Prioritize Targets 




Send Fire Command 
Assess 




Figure 15. OV-5a: AI-AMD Operational Activity Decomposition - Internal 




Figure 16. OV-5a: AI-AMD Operational Activity Decomposition – External 




d. DoDAF OV-5b: Operational Activity Model 
The OV-5b activity model is built upon the relationship defined in the OV-5a and 
the inputs-controls-outputs-mechanisms (ICOM) between each agent. Figure 17 shows the 
high-level activities performed by the AI-AMD decision aid and external agents. Figure 17 
also defines the inputs and outputs of each action performed by the agent, controls that 
trigger or limit the functionality, and the mechanisms needed to enable a particular 
function. It also demonstrates how the AI-AMD system communicates with other peer SoS 
systems via the shared network. Jones et al. (2020) then carried out a detailed study of the 
AI-AMD decision aid operational activities and its relationships with other peer SoS 
systems as depicted in Figure 18.  
 
Figure 17. OV-5b: AI-AMD Operational Model. Source: Jones et al. (2020). 
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Figure 18. OV-5b: Decomposed AI-AMD Operational Activity Model. 
Source: Jones et al. (2020). 
e. DoDAF OV-5b/6c: Action Diagram 
Jones et al. (2020) developed the OV-5b/6c by combining the operational activity 
model and event trace diagram to demonstrate the inputs and outputs of the operational 
activities and the sequence of events to establish the relationships amongst the peer 
systems. Figure 19 shows the set of AI-AMD top-level activities performed with the 
external agents. Green boxes represent the triggers such as exchanges of information or 
controls for enabling actions. Gray boxes represent the outputs of AI-AMD decision aid 
activities pass as inputs (gray boxes) into the next F2T2EA step.  
The AMD operation commences when a REDFOR launches an attack against the 
BLUFOR. BLUFOR will be unaware of the threat until it crosses a detection boundary. 
Once the threat crosses the boundary, a “signature” trigger will be sent through the network 
to the external sensor system. The network will then receive raw data and pass it further to 
the AI-AMD decision aid. The AI-AMD will then request more information of the target 





Figure 19. OV-5b/6c: AI-AMD Action Diagram. Source: Jones et al. (2020). 
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The network will then pass the sensor data to the AI-AMD decision aid with a 
“passed info” trigger. A “valid detection” output to track the target will be made after the 
AI-AMD decision aid successfully identify the target. The fix step is a continuous loop 
process where the AI-AMD system is continuously updating the decision aid based on 
sensor data. 
The AI-AMD track step performs two key functions: (1) to update sensor detection 
tracks and (2) to determine BLUFOR defeat capabilities based on the target track. Once 
the track step is initiated, the AI-AMD decision aid will then send a “track request” to the 
network. The network will further send a “passed track” to the sensor to update the target 
track and a “BLUFOR ping” to BLUFOR assets to determine the location and status of 
BLUFOR assets. The sensor will then send an “updated track” to the network, and the 
network will send a “passed track” to the AI-AMD system. Location data from the external 
BLUFOR systems using the trigger “passed location” is used by the track step to update 
the “target window.” The track and target steps are in a continuous loop where information 
of the sensor detection tracks and BLUFOR location data are continuously being updated. 
Once the AI-AMD has established both the target track and BLUFOR location data, it will 
output the “target window” to the next step, target. 
The AI-AMD decision aid will receive the BLUFOR location and status from the 
network using the trigger “passed status.” This information is obtained from the BLUFOR 
assets using the trigger “location and status.” The AI-AMD system will then generate 
Courses-of-action (COA) using the information obtained. It will also select an engagement 
and send a “final targeting” trigger to the next step, engage. 
The engage step has two main functions: (1) to issue orders and (2) to send fire 
commands to the BLUFOR systems. The AI-AMD system will issue “orders” and “fire 
command” triggers to the network. The orders will then be sent to the BLUFOR system 
using the trigger “passed orders.” Also, once the fire command is received by the BLUFOR 
system using the trigger “passed fire command,” the BLUFOR system will shoot at the 
threat. The AI-AMD decision aid will then output “engagement control” to the next step, 
assess. 
70 
f. Decomposed F2T2EA Kill-Chain Functions 
Jones et al. (2016) reviewed the JP 3-60 targeting doctrine and further decomposed 
each of the F2T2EA AI-enabled decision aid operational activities into lower-level 
activities. Figure 20 shows the decomposition of the F2T2EA Find step into three serialized 
activities; (1) Collect Data, (2) Accept Initial Detection, and (3) Identity Emerging Threat. 
The “collect data” activity is triggered by the “sensor data” input and concludes with an 
output of “potential target” which is a trigger to the Fix step.  
 
Figure 20. Decomposition of F2T2EA Find Step. Source: Jones et al. (2020). 
Figure 21 shows the decomposition of the F2T2EA Fix step into four activities; (1) 
request further information, (2) classify target, (3) locate target, and (4) validate detection 
with (2) and (3) carried out in parallel. The Fix step has several triggers such as accepting 
the “potential target” from the Find step, “passed info” from the sensors to classify and 





Figure 21. Decomposition of F2T2EA Fix Step. Source: Jones et al. (2020). 
Figure 22 shows the decomposition of the F2T2EA Track step into three activities; 
(1) request updated target track, (2) validate target, and (3) assess blue proximity with (2) 
and (3) conducted in parallel. This step starts with a trigger of “valid detection” from the 
Fix step. A track request will be output to the sensors. The “passed track” trigger is used to 
validate the target and the “passed location” is used to assess BLUFOR proximity. The AI-
AMD decision aid uses the BLUFOR data on location and the valid target to determine the  
“target window” to destroy a threat target.  
 
Figure 22. Decomposition of F2T2EA Track Step. Source: Jones et al. (2020). 
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Figure 23 shows the decomposition of the F2T2EA Target step into a series of three 
activities; (1) nominate engagement options, (2) prioritize targets, and (3) select attack 
options(s). The Target step starts with a trigger “target window” from the Track step. The 
trigger “passed status” will star the nominate engagement options activity. This Target step 
will conclude with a “final targeting” output passed to Engage step.  
 
Figure 23. Decomposition of F2T2EA Target Step. Source: Jones et al. 
(2020). 
Figure 24 shows the decomposition of the F2T2EA Engage step into a series of two 
activities; (1) issue orders, and (2) send fire command. This step starts with the trigger 
“final targeting” from the Target step to issue orders to the BLUFOR weapon systems. The 
AI-AMD will then output “fire command” to the BLUFOR weapon systems to carry out 
the engagement. This step concludes with an “engagement control” to the last step, Assess.  
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Figure 24. Decomposition of F2T2EA Engage Step. Source: Jones et al. 
(2020). 
Figure 25 shows the decomposition of the F2T2EA Assess step into a series of two 
activities; (1) assess target status, and (2) authorize re-attack. This step starts with a trigger 
engagement control from the Engage step. The “passed assessment” trigger will then start 
the assess target status. If the REDFOR threat is not neutralized, the AI-AMD decision aid 
will output a re-attack command to the BLUFOR weapon system to re-engagement the 
target. This step concludes the entire AI-AMD operational activities within the OV-5b 
model.   
 
Figure 25. Decomposition of F2T2EA Engage Step. Source: Jones et al. 
(2020). 
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2. Characteristics of AI-AMD System  
This section discusses several characteristics of AMD operations that are important 
to the study of human-AI trust.  
a. AI-AMD Operations are Inherently Complex & Time-Sensitive 
The AMD operations are inherently complex due to the element of surprise and 
short decision space. The AMD operations are highly reactive in nature as the BLUFOR 
are in a defensive stance. The fielding of more advanced weapons such as hypersonic 
missiles presents immense challenges to the AMD operator as the window of engagement 
is reduced significantly. Additionally, the operators may encounter multiple threats that 
require the operators’ simultaneous response to each of these threats. The operator faces 
immense stress due to the information overload and increased mental workload in such a 
time-stressed scenario. As such, as the AMD operations become more complex, a well-
established AI-AMD decision aid is required to help alleviate some of the operator 
workloads. Some tasks and decisions that were traditionally performed by the operator 
could be carried out or recommended by AI. These will help to reduce the time for decision-
making. However, to produce a high-performance AI-AMD decision aid, there must be 
trust between the operator and AI-AMD decision aid.  
b. Fully Autonomous AMD System will not be Viable in near Future  
The AMD operations involve a function to destroy a target that takes human lives. 
This raises ethical concerns when an autonomous system is authorized to make decisions 
to kill humans. There had been instances of AMD fratricide such as the USS Vincennes 
incident and two U.S. Army’s Patriot system fratricides on British Tornado and Navy F-
18 during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Second Gulf War. The Patriot incident happened 
when the Patriot was placed on automatic mode (Hawley 2017). These incidents derail any 
efforts for the automation community to advance and field fully autonomous weapons. For 
instance, there had been no lethal autonomous weapon systems developed since the 1980s 
in the U.S. The argument against the use of these autonomous weapons is the perceived 
lack of accountability and a perceived inability to comply with international humanitarian 
laws. Also, as Scharre (2018) noted, the use of these autonomous weapons involves high 
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operational risks that could arise from software errors, unexpected environmental 
influences, and malicious enemy actions. As such, the human operator is still needed to 
operate in or on-the-loop of the AMD operations. 
c. Human-AI Integration is Paramount for Successful AMD Operations 
Since the AI-AMD operators operate the AI decision aid with human-like 
intelligence, the concept of an effective team would apply. The AI decision aid can be seen 
as the human teammate operating alongside the operators. The AI-AMD decision aid must 
be able to perform to what the operator expected and help improve the performance of the 
operator. Trust which is the foundation of an effective and successful team would thus 
apply to a human-AI team. The operator has many interactions with the AI-AMD decision 
aid through the functions that the operator must perform. The AI-AMD decision aid should 
be leveraged to perform the overall performance. The operator must also be clear on his 
involvement and decision authority in every phase of the operations. For instance, the 
operator must be clear when he is “in-the-loop” (the AI-AMD must wait for the operator 
to take any action before continuing) or “on-the-loop” (operator supervises the AI-AMD 
and intervenes when necessary) of the decision-making process to better appreciate the 
value of the AI-AMD decision aid and its responsibility.  
C. REVIEW OF U.S. ARMY PATRIOT MISSILE SYSTEM 
The U.S. Army Patriot system was one of the first lethal automated tactical systems 
to be employed in combat. The U.S. Army Patriot operates with two modes: automatic and 
semi-automatic. The semi-automatic mode is a human-in-the-loop system. The Patriot 
engagement-control algorithms and methods employed in the system’s automatic mode 
were modified from Safeguard, the United States’ first operational anti-ballistic missile 
system. Safeguard’s level of automation was not suited for Patriot as the mission and 
operating environment of the two systems were different. The Patriot system decision cycle 
is illustrated in Figure 26 and is similar to what was reviewed earlier in the chapter.  
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Figure 26. Patriot Missile System Decision Cycle. Source: Hawley (2017).  
The Patriot was first used operationally during Operation Desert Strom against Iraqi 
Scuds (crude tactical ballistic missiles) in the early 1990s. The ballistic missile engagement 
scenario during Operation Desert Storm mandated more automation support. As a result, 
the Patriot was placed in automatic mode to illustrate the potential for an appropriate and 
timely new system. During Operation Desert Storm, the Patriot system successfully 
engaged scud missiles. However, the track classification and identification automatic mode 
had minor problems. These issues were overlooked since nothing disastrous occurred. 
Complacency set developed, resulting in an inappropriate trust and dependence on Patriot’s 
automatic mode. 
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. Patriot was involved in two fratricide 
incidents, one with a British Tornado and the other involving a Navy F-18. After a post-
incident review, it was found out that the U.S. Army had failed to adapt to a new complex 
capability of the Patriot’s automatic mode. Specifically, the U.S. Army over-trusted the 
Patriot system and became over-reliance on it. They were not sufficiently prepared and 
trained for proper monitoring of the Patriot’s automated operating mode and were 




This section discusses six key insights from this Patriot case study. 
(1) Automated Systems Seldom Meet the Performance Requirements 
Newly developed automated systems seldom live up to the expectation (Hawley 
2017). Users need to decide how they should practically use the automated system rather 
than wholeheartedly using the system the way the developer thought it should be used. 
Hawley (2017) claimed that system developers are frequently unable to predict all the 
operational issues that an automated system may cause. “Surprises” from automation are 
to be expected. Accepting the system without question may result in automation misuse or 
over-reliance.  
(2) Automation Usually Increases System Monitoring Workload 
Automation may not always simplify the operator’s work as the nature of the 
operator’s job usually changes with automation (Hawley 2017). Automation is often 
associated with a complex system with many components. Many times, automation reduces 
the amount of time an operator spent on physically working on tasks. However, the 
operator must now monitor more indicators from the system due to an increased number 
of components. Prolonged vigilance on the system involves tough mental work and can be 
stressful. The author argued that it is cognitively challenging for the operator to sustain a 
high level of vigilance for an extended period when nothing out of the ordinary is 
happening. As such, it is unrealistic to expect a high level of vigilance from an operator 
monitoring the automated system for 23 hours 59 minutes and expect a high level of 
performance during that one minute of panic when a target is impending.  
(3) Accept the Notion that Automation System can Fail 
The belief that the system is always right will give the operator a false impression 
of the system. Hawley (2017) claimed that this will result in complacency and not 
conducting the necessary checks. A prolonged period of complacency will result in reduced 
vigilance and operational caution. Trust in the system must be built incrementally from 
experience and interactions and will always be context specific. He suggested that 
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operators must operate the system long enough to gain sufficient experience to determine 
when to trust the system and when to scrutinize and supervise the system closely.  
(4) Automation Changes the Job Scope of Operator from Manual Control to 
Supervisory Control  
The operator’s job shifts from direct manual management of system operations to 
higher-level supervisory control because of automation. The operator is usually tasked to 
“monitor” the automated system if it is functioning and performing as expected and 
intervene when necessary. So far, humans have difficulty meeting the monitoring and 
intervention demands required by this on-the-loop control (Hawley 2017). 
(5) Out-of-the-loop Familiarity 
The operators’ interactions and familiarity with the system will reduce when tasks 
are being allocated to automation. There is evidence that the operator will be slower to 
react and take appropriate actions during an abnormal situation (Hawley 2017). The 
operator loses SA, and the operator must scramble “back into the loop” to establish SA to 
make an appropriate decision. In the long run, operators may lose fundamental skillsets 
and proficiency in operating and controlling the system as they get less hands-on 
experience. 
(6) Need for Increased Training Requirement 
It is challenging for humans to meet the performance demands required for the on-
the-loop supervisory control. The need for sustained vigilance and maintaining broad SA 
for interventions is a problematic challenge. It is unreasonable to expect humans to have 
reliable control over a complex automated system. As such, operator’s training must adapt 
to meet the new challenges with automation.  
An automation system that is usually more complex would cause operational skills 
to be more difficult to learn and retain. Also, the operator is required to have deep 
knowledge of the automated system he is operating for appropriate intervention when 
necessary. They must understand the “nuts and bolts” of how the system works. The current 
practice of frequent simulator training or in-the-loop training to deal with out-of-the loop 
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control skill decay is problematic. There are difficulties generating invaluable stressful 
scenarios which are essential for the operator to develop and maintain the necessary skillset 
for out-of-the loop control. Long-term training employing a hands-on instructional regimen 
that encourages operators to cope with difficult scenarios to develop their proficiency and 
understanding of the system can lead to expertise. 
D. KEY TAKEAWAYS FROM CHAPTER III 
This section of Chapter III summarizes the key points of this chapter. These 
pointers will be useful for Chapters IV and V of this thesis.  
The review of the AMD threats and operational scenarios reveals the importance of 
AI to augment the operator to deal with increasingly complex situations. A key success 
factor for the operator to exploit the benefits of AI being applied to the AMD system would 
be a trusting relationship with a trustworthy AI-AMD system. Additionally, the inclusion 
of AI in the system will increase the complexity of the interactions between humans and 
the system. As such, a deliberate study of the HMI is necessary for effective interactions 
which is an ingredient for a trusting relationship. 
The review of the operational viewpoints of the AMD operations led to the 
functional analysis of the AI-AMD system. It suggests that the AI-AMD C2 system 
through the network interfaces is the most critical aspect of the entire system as it 
coordinates the entire operations from detecting a target to engaging it. It produced 17-step 
kill-chain functions which will be used to describe the HMI between the operator and AI-
AMD decision aid.  
An in-depth study of the AMD operational viewpoints and the current acceptance 
of automated systems within DOD also highlights that a fully automated AI-AMD system 
will not be viable soon. Human is still required to be part of the system. As such, further 
analysis of the HMI between humans and AI-AMD across the 17-step kill-chain functions 
will have to be carried out. A clear level of human involvement and/or automation across 
all functions must be specified. Once the HMI is described sufficiently, further study of the 
relevant trust factors will then be identified to develop the strategy.  
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IV. ANALYSIS OF TRUST, HUMAN-MACHINE INTERACTIONS 
(HMI) AND TRUST FACTORS OF AI-AMD SYSTEM 
This chapter discusses the boundaries and environment that the AMD operations 
take place in which will bound the scope of subsequent analysis. Next, it presents a 
framework of trust associated with human and AI-AMD teaming. Next, it describes the 
HMI between warfare operators and the AI-AMD system. The chapter concludes with the 
identification of relevant trust factors.  
A. SYSTEM BOUNDARIES AND ENVIRONMENT 
Two broad categories of systems are discussed in this thesis: (1) the AI-AMD 
overall system, which is comprised of the C2 system, sensor systems, and BLUFOR 
weapon systems and (2) the external systems which are comprised of the operational 
environment, the organizational environment, and threats. The AI-AMD C2 is expected to 
be operating in a System-of-systems (SoS) architecture. The integration of these multiple 
systems may result in emergence behaviors that are hard to predict. Figure 27 shows a 
context diagram of the AI-AMD C2 system and other sub-systems it interacts with that 
contribute to trust development between the operator and AI-AMD decision aid. The 
following sub-sections elaborate on the various components and interactions.  
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Figure 27. AI-AMD System Context Diagram. 
1. AI-AMD C2 System  
The C2 system consists of the AI-AMD operator working together with the AI-
AMD decision aid as a teammate. The C2 system is expected to act as the central node to 
fuse intelligence data from the sensors system and coordinate with the BLUFOR weapon 
systems through engagement orders/reports into an integrated fire control network. This 
integrated network would provide the individual ground operators the agility necessary to 
support seamless operations through collaborative and shared situation awareness (SA). 
The C2 system is the most essential component in the entire AI-AMD overall system as it 
is the central authority to coordinate the entire kill-chain from collecting sensor data to 
engaging and re-engagement targets. Hence, the HMI between the operator and decision 
aid is critical. As illustrated in Chapter III on the review of the operational viewpoints and 
functional analysis of the AI-AMD decision aid, a total of 17 kill chain functions must be 
executed and coordinated with other peer systems to complete the entire kill chain. As 
discussed previously, a fully autonomous AI-AMD system will not be viable anytime soon. 
As such, the success of the C2 system is dependent on how well the operator and the AI-
AMD decision aid work together and a trusting relationship is key to enable this.  
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a. AI-AMD Operator 
As discussed in Chapter III on the review of threat scenarios, the evolving threats 
and technology have driven the need for a faster and more decisive response against a set 
of wide-ranging threats. The operator is no longer expected to deal with a single threat at a 
time. Instead, the operator is expected to manage a pool of resources against multiple 
threats simultaneously. This has driven the role of the AMD operator to change from a 
traditional manual controller of the system to a supervisory controller. Some of the 
functions that humans traditionally performed are now re-delegated to the AI-AMD. These 
functions include those that require psychomotor, sensory, and cognitive skills (Hawkley, 
Mares, and Giammanco 2005; Hopkin 1992). According to Hawkley, Mares, and 
Giammanco (2005), the job of a supervisory controller differs from that of a traditional 
manual operator.  
Also, the operator is subjected to an operational environment that introduces flux 
and ever-changing information from electromagnetic interference, weather terrain 
conditions. These will create additional stressors to the operator, demanding additional 
cognitive workload to deal with these dynamics.  
Last, as discussed in Chapter II on the review of trust factors, the organizational 
environment that the operators are in will influence their level of competency, and mental 
model shaped by the organizational culture. These factors will be identified and studied in 
the latter part of this chapter. 
b. AI-AMD Decision Aid 
The AI-AMD decision aid in this thesis is defined as an automation system that has 
a smart computer agent that can perform tasks with human-like intelligence that are 
attributed with the intent of the operator (U.S. DOD 2018). As discussed previously, one 
of the most promising solutions to the threat scenarios presented is the adoption of an AI-
AMD system that relies extensively on automation operations. In this thesis, it is expected 
that the AI-AMD decision aid was built to fulfill functions that operators do poorly or at a 
high workload cost, as well as to augment performance in areas where operators have 
constraints. The AI-AMD decision aid is not designed to replace the human operator but 
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to augment the operator in accomplishing the mission tasks. The AI-AMD decision aid and 
operator are treated to work together as “teammates” with a shared goal of accomplishing 
the mission tasks. An important theme that arises from this notion of “teammates” is the 
functional allocation between human operators and AI-AMD decision aid which will be 
discussed later in this chapter.  
2. Sensors  
Sensors such as radar provide the AI-AMD C2 system with the intelligence 
preparations and targeting data needed to direct fires onto incoming targets. The sensors 
are needed to provide threat warning and situational awareness to maximize the potential 
capabilities of the AI-AMD system beyond the line of sight targeting and fires. Only when 
the AI-AMD C2 system is made known of the incoming threat, then the AI-AMD 
BLUFOR weapon system can be better employed for the appropriate courses of action 
(COA) to engage the target. Interactions between the sensors and the AI-AMD C2 system 
include incoming target coordinates, type and classification, and metrological data that 
would support the targeting of the system (Tay 2020).  
3. BLUFOR Weapon System  
The AI-AMD C2 System is expected to interact and coordinate with BLUFOR 
weapon system to engage the target. Some of these systems include the U.S. Army Patriot 
system, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) as well as non-kinetic systems to 
provide layered protection against aerial threats. These systems will exchange readiness 
reports, engagement orders, and reports, and battle damage assessment (BDA) on their 
targets with the AI-AMD C2 system.  
4. Operational Environment  
The AI-AMD system is subjected to external environmental conditions such as 
weather, electromagnetic traffic, and terrain. These conditions can be treated as 
unidirectional inputs to the AI-AMD system which affects the performance of the system. 
The environmental conditions will be dynamic that demands flexibility and ability by the 
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operator and the AI-AMD decision aid to deal with them. The operator and the AI-AMD 
decision aid must be trained and designed to operate in this environment for effective HMI.  
5. Organizational Environment  
The consideration of the organizational environment is included as trust does not 
develop in a vacuum and is shaped by the individual and cultural context. Individual 
differences such as the operator’s competency level and mental model of the system are 
included in the individual context. The cultural backdrop influences trust through societal 
norms and expectations of automation and autonomous systems. These factors as 
previously discussed in Chapter II have an influence on trust development and are included 
in this study.  
6. Threats 
First, as discussed in Chapter III on the review of threats scenarios, the threat 
interaction includes a wide range of hypersonic and cruise missiles, as well as UAVs and 
fighter aircraft attacks, which are inputs into the AI-AMD system. These threats have 
become more complex and harder to destroy due to their increased operational range and 
velocity. This translates to a much shorter response time demanded of the operator to 
execute the entire kill chain to destroy the target. As such, effective HMI enabled through 
a trusting relationship between the operator and AI-AMD decision aid is needed to fulfill 
this requirement. Also, the methodology and training data used to develop the AI algorithm 
for the decision aid is important in building a trustworthy system. However, this will not 
be included as it is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
The second type of threat arises in a situation when the AI-AMD decision aid 
recommends an incongruent recommendation from the operator’s CONOPs and TTPs. 
This situation creates a temporal trust deficit where the operator anticipates that the AI-
AMD decision aid would propose a COA that is aligned to what the operator would do. 
The operator will likely distrust the AI-AMD system and not adopt the recommendation 
which may be necessary under that situation. This type of threat situation requires a further 
analysis of the HMI.  
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B. TRUST CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND DEFINITIONS 
This section presents a conceptual framework for defining trust between human 
warfare operators and AI-AMD decision aids. Figure 28 illustrates this conceptual 
framework. The y-axis represents the level of trust human has for the AI-AMD decision 
aid while the x-axis represents the capability of the AI-AMD decision aid. The green dotted 
45° line shows the optimum trust level or calibrated trust line, where trust corresponds to 
AI-AMD capabilities, resulting in proper utilization (Lee and See 2004). Over-trust is 
represented by the region above the optimum trust level line, when trust exceeds system 
capabilities, resulting in misuse. The zone below the ideal level of trust shows distrust, 
where trust falls short of system capabilities, resulting in disuse. In this thesis, it is assumed 
that there exists some level of default trust (shown as the yellow box), the goal is to develop 
a strategy to improve the trust given an AI-AMD decision aid capability. Trust violations 
might occur that reduce the operator’s trust when operating with the system. Hence, trust 
repair actions must be incorporated to maintain the trust at an optimum level.  
 
Figure 28. Trust between Human Operator and AI-AMD Decision Aid. 
87 
1. Trust  
Trust refers to the operator’s attitude that an AI-AMD decision aid will help to 
achieve the operator’s goals of accomplishing the mission of destroying incoming threats 
promptly in an operational environment that is characterized by uncertainty and 
vulnerability. This definition of trust indicates that it is an emotional assessment of what 
the operator believes or perceives of the AI-AMD decision aid. To positively influence 
trust, the operator must personally see and feel the positivity of the AI-AMD decision aid 
actions. Hence, the inclusion of subjective factors that were previously reviewed must be 
included in the analysis of trust factors which will subsequently inform the strategy to 
improve trust.  
As noted earlier, the AI-AMD operations involve a lot of uncertainties and 
vulnerabilities arising from the environmental factors of weather, electromagnetic 
interferences, and terrain as well as the nature of the ever-evolving threats. The operator 
will anticipate that the AI-AMD decision aid performs as per “contracts” to deal with these 
uncertainties and vulnerabilities. In this context, the contracts would be the perceived 
functions or tasks that the AI-AMD decision aid is supposed to carry out as well as the 
desirable performance of carrying out these functions or tasks.  
2. AI-AMD Decision Aid Capability and Trustworthiness  
In the topic of trust, it is important to distinguish between trust from being 
trustworthy and system trustworthiness. Trust as defined earlier is an attitude of the 
operator while trustworthiness is a property of the AI-AMD decision aid. The AI-AMD 
decision aid is trustworthy to some contracts if it can uphold the contracts that the user 
desires through its capabilities. The capabilities of the AI-AMD decision aid include the 
speed, accuracy, predictability, reliability of performing the functions or tasks as well as 
the ability to provide feedback to the operator. This thesis will not study how to improve 
these capabilities to improve trustworthiness. Instead, this thesis explores means to 
improve the operator’s perception of these capabilities to improve trust.  
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3. Default Trust 
As noted earlier in the review of trust definitions, the concept of default trust is 
useful as it defines the starting point of the trust level between a human operator and the 
AI-AMD decision aid. This will have an impact on the strategy needed to develop, 
maintain, and repair trust. Figure 28 illustrates the default trust level with a yellow box. In 
this thesis, the level of default trust is assumed to be in the distrust region such that the 
level of trust falls short of the AI-AMD decision aid capabilities leading to disuse which is 
undesirable.  
4. Optimum Level of Trust/Calibrated Trust, Trust Violations and 
Repair 
The optimum amount of trust or calibrated trust occurs when trust meets the system 
capabilities, as represented by the green dotted line in Figure 28. It is in the interests of the 
stakeholders to ensure that the trust in any system is kept at the optimum level for high 
performance. As noted earlier, that the initial trust an operator has on a new system would 
be below the desired level regardless of the amount of experience he has on other similar 
systems. Hence, there must be a deliberate strategy to calibrate the trust level to the desired 
level.  
In addition, as noted earlier, trust is dynamic and it changes with time as it is 
affected by many factors interacting with each other continuously (Hoffman 2017; Chien 
et al. 2014). For instance, we would expect trust to increase as the operator uses the system 
for a long time and become reliant on it. This is undesirable as it may result in catastrophic 
failure as we know that no automation system is perfect, and it can fail. On the other hand, 
we would expect instances of trust violations with various consequences, which would 
reduce the operator’s trust in the AI-AMD decision assistance. Errors, damages, time loss, 
and inefficiency from the AI-AMD decision aid are examples of trust violations. Trust is 
likely to fluctuate over time. Hence, this suggests that the strategy should have a way to 
estimate the optimum trust level and ensure that the trust is kept at that level during the 
operator’s tenure as an AI-AMD operator.  
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C. HUMAN-MACHINE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN HUMAN 
OPERATORS AND AI-AMD DECISION AIDS 
This section describes the HMI between human operators and AI-AMD decision 
aids to deepen the understanding of the AI-AMD C2 system. This provides insights into 
the factors influencing trust. This section describes the functional allocations between 
operators and an AI-AMD decision aid. Next, a characterization of the HMI based on the 
functional allocation is presented. Next, the section discusses design constructs across the 
functions. Finally, the section concludes with a discussion on the implications of the 
proposed HMI on trust.  
1. Functional Allocations between Operator and AI-AMD Decision Aid 
HMI is defined as the interactions and communications between an operator and 
AI-AMD decision aid via a user interface. As noted earlier, the interactions between 
humans and the AI-AMD decision aid system should be studied at a functionality level 
(across the multiple functions) as the human operator interacts in executing a function/task 
instead of the entire system (Lee and See 2004). As such, the analysis of HMI begins by 
allocating functions between operators and the AI-AMD decision aid.  
The principles adopted in functional allocations are as follows (Save, Feuerberg, 
and Avia 2012):  
• The AI-AMD C2 system can support multiple functions, each with a distinct 
LOA. 
• The LOA was chosen by taking into account human performance parameters 
such as cognitive workload. 
• The automation level was determined by ensuring that the human operator has 
a set of coherent tasks to perform for meaningful active participation in the 
entire operation. This will help to ensure that the operator has the same SA as 
the AI-AMD decision aid.  
Hence, before allocating functions to either human operator, or AI-AMD decision, 
or both, the level of automation across all functions must be determined. The 10-point scale 
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of LOA by Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens (2000) was adopted (see Table 1). For 
instance, for a function with a score of 10, that function is fully allocated to the AI-AMD 
decision aid as the computer does and decides everything, ignoring humans. For a function 
with a score of 1, the function is fully allocated to the operator as the operator performs all 
decisions and actions. For a function with a point scale between 2 to 9, which is very 
common, the functions are shared between the operator and AI-AMD decision aid. 
However, the ultimate responsibility of the decision made still lies on the operator as he 
makes the final decision to execute a function.  
In this thesis, the level of automation of each of the kill chain functions was 
determined based on two factors: (1) decision risk and (2) cognitive workload. This 
consideration provides a more balanced approach in determining the level of automation 
by considering the negative impacts and human performance ability.  
a. Decision Risk 
Risk is defined as the product of an event’s likelihood and impact (U.S. DOD 2017). 
Decision risk is a significant consideration when determining the LOA of a function. 
Ethically, there is still a consensus that high-risk activity should be undertaken by humans 
because of the accountability of outcomes. For example, it is proposed that a high-risk 
function/task be allocated a lower level of autonomy where the operator maintains the 
situation awareness and has full accountability of the decision and action taken.  
Jones et al. (2020) performed the risk analysis based on the risk assessment 
presented in the DOD Risk Issues and Opportunities Guide, and the decision risk of each 
kill chain function was adopted (DOD 2017). The decision risk associated with each 
function is determined based on its likelihood and impact. The “risk value” can then be 
calculated by considering both likelihood and impact. The risk assessment value can then 
be calculated based on the criteria shown in Table 13. The kill chain functions, their 
descriptions, decision risk assessment, and values are given in Table 14.  
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Table 13. Risk Assessment Criteria. Adapted from DOD (2017). 
 
Table 14. Summary of Kill Chain Functions and Decision Risk Values. 
Adapted from Jones et al. (2020). 
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b. Cognitive Workload  
The cognitive workload is the “amount of physical and mental resources needed to 
carry out a set of tasks in an environment” (Evans and Fendley 2017). A practical approach 
to functional/task allocation would be based on performance (Fitts 1951). It is reasonable 
that for functions with a high workload to be allocated to machines either partially or fully 
as humans are likely to not perform as well (Jordan 1963). While task overload seems 
intuitive that leads to function being automated, underload can also be problematic. Warm, 
Parasuraman, and Matthews (2008) for example, found that maintaining efficient visual 
attention to a display with little action is difficult and stressful even for highly driven 
individuals. Hence, more deliberate consideration of the function is warranted.  
In this work, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration-Task Load Index 
(NASA-TLX) as outlined in Hart (2006) was adapted to determine the workload of the kill 
chain functions. The NASA-TLX is a subjective cognitive workload assessment tool 
comprised of six somewhat independent variable subscales: mental, physical, temporal 
demands, frustration, effort, and performance (Hart 2006). The rating scales and definitions 
of these six variables are given in Figure 29. Each of the variables is scored from zero to 
100 with a 5-point scale. Each function’s NASA-TLX score is calculated by averaging the 
scores for each of the six subscales (Evans and Fendley 2017).  
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Figure 29. NASA-TLX Rating Scale and Definition. Source: Hart (2006). 
An analysis was carried out across the 17 kill chain functions to determine the rating 
of two of the variables: mental demand and temporal demand. Physical demand was not 
included as all the kill chain functions are sedentary in nature that require little physical 
activity. All functions can be assumed to be equally undemanding. The other three were 
not included as they required real-life experiences with the operational system. The overall 
rating of the cognitive workload of each kill chain function was determined by averaging 
the three ratings. A summary of the ratings is given in Table 15. A similar scale as given 






Table 15. NASA-TLX Rating across 17 Kill Chain Functions.  
F2T2EA Kill Chain Functions 
NASA-TLX 








Collect Data 85 50 68 Moderate 
Accept Initial Detection 90 60 75 High 
Identify Emerging 




Information 30 60 45 Low 
Classify Target 100 75 88 High 
Locate Target 80 75 78 High 
Validate Detection 85 80 83 High 
Track 
Request Updated Target 
Track 30 60 45 Low 
Validate Target 85 85 85 High 
Assess Blue Proximity 90 85 88 High 
Target 
Nominate Engagement 
Options 60 85 78 Moderate 
Prioritize Targets 80 85 83 High 
Select Attack Option(s) 80 85 83 High 
Engage Issue Orders 50 90 70 Moderate Send Fire Command 40 95 68 Moderate 
Assess Assess Target Status 80 95 88 High Authorize Re-attack 50 100 75 High 
 
Table 16. Cognitive Workload Criteria.  
Color Cognitive Workload Rating 
Green Low > 0 
Green Moderate-Low > 49 
Yellow Moderate > 64 
Red High > 74 
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2. Proposed Level of Automation (LOA) and Functional Allocation 
The LOA of the respective functions was determined using decision risk value and 
cognitive workload as well as considering the need to ensure that human operator has a set 
of coherent tasks to perform for active participation in the entire operation through a shared 
situation awareness with the AI-AMD decision aid. Table 17 summarizes the decision risk 
value, cognitive workload, proposed LOA, functional allocation, and its rationale. As part 
of the design to ensure that the operator maintains the same situational awareness as the 
AI-AMD decision aid, the operator is designed to be “in-the-loop” at every step of the 
F2T2EA kill chain.  
The kill chain functions are allocated to two parties: AI-AMD decision aid and 
team, where the team indicates that both AI-AMD decision aid and operator work together 
in accomplishing the tasks. It is argued in every step of the kill chain functions; automation 
must be present to help the operator perform those tasks that are cognitively demanding. 
This will help to shorten the entire decision-making process to better respond to the ever-




Table 17. Summary of Kill Chain Function Allocations. 
F2T2EA Kill Chain Functions 









Allocation Allocation Rationale 
Find 
Collect Data 
Gather sensor data from 
all the sensors in the 
network of systems. It 
also involves pre-
processing and storing of 
data 




Initiating the sensors to collect data can be 
fully autonomous with little risk to the 
operator. Looking through the data and 
understanding the data requires the 
operator’s attention. It is better for the AI-
AMD decision which can process these data 
faster and more consistency. 
Accept Initial 
Detection 
Fuse massive amount of 




AI-AMD decision aid is more suited to 
perform this function as it is demanding on 
cognitive workload. Also, this is a low-risk 




Retrieve similar cases 
and match with collected 
data to confirm it as an 
anomaly 
Low High 7 Team 
LOA of 7 was proposed to ensure that the 
operator maintains an oversight of the entire 
“Find” step. This helps to maintain the 





Trigger the sensors to 
continue gathering more 
sensor data on the 
emerging target 




This function is a C2 function carried out by 
the system to request more information. 
Also, the risk of this step is low. As such, it 




Decide on target type 
from data mining 
knowledge base 
Moderate-
Low High 7 Team 
This step requires a high cognitive 
workload as it requires the emerging threat 
to be check against the threat classification 
database. Also, there is a moderate-low risk 
as a wrongly classified threat could have a 
significant consequence. Hence, a LOA of 
7 is preferred.  
Locate 
Target 
Monitor in space and 
time and calculate the 
target coordinates 
Moderate-
Low High 7 Team 
Under a time-stressed scenario, it is 
challenging to accurately calculate and 
determine a target’s location that is ever 
changing. Also, there is a moderate-low risk 
as a wrongly located target could have a 
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Allocation Allocation Rationale 
disastrous effect on position, navigate and 
time needed for response. Hence, a LOA of 
7 is preferred.  
Validate 
Detection 
Predict the trajectory and 
intent of threat and 
confirm it as a threat 
Moderate-
Low High 7 Team 
The operator has to decipher and fuse 
several information of the target initial 
detection, classification and locations to 
confirm a target is a threat. It is challenging 
to do it quickly and accurately. The risk 
involved is considered moderate-low as a 
wrongly validated target could have a 
catastrophic effect on BLUFOR. Hence, a 





Trigger the sensors to 




This function is a C2 function carried out by 
the system to request more information as 
the sensors track the target after new 
detections are locations have been 
established. Also, the risk of this step is 
low. As such, it is desired for it to be 









Low High 7 Team 
This function requires the operator to fuse 
the target tracks and intent against the 
BLUFOR weapon systems. It is stressful to 
perform it accurately. The risk of this step 
is moderate-low because there are several 
critical follow-on functions where false 
alarms should be kept at a minimal.  
Assess Blue 
Proximity 
Combine location data of 
BLUFOR weapon 
systems against target 
locations and BLUFOR 
readiness data 
High High 5 Team 
This function requires merging both the 
threats data and BLUFOR weapon systems 
locations. It is challenging as there are 
numerous weapon systems deployed with a 
fast-moving target. Also, this is a high-risk 
function as any miscalculations could have 
catastrophic effects on BLUFOR. Hence, a 
LOA of 5. 
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Assess utility (capability) 
and readiness of 
BLUFOR weapon 
systems 




This function requires the operator to list 
out the viable options by merging the data 
on the availability and locations of 
BLUFOR weapon systems against threat 
trajectory. This is a low-risk function 
because it just involves listing the 
possibilities of BLUFOR weapon systems 
available to engage the threat. Also, it is 
assumed that the operator wants this to be 
carried out quickly for follow-on 




Rank targets based on 
threats level. Assesses 
both probability and 
utility of threat 
knowledge 
Moderate High 5 Team 
This function is a critical and time sensitive 
step to determine the priority of targets 
based on their threat level presented to the 
operator. The risk is considered moderate as 
a wrong prioritization may result in the 
target not being engaged in time. Hence, a 
LOA of 5 is preferred where the operator 
approves, and acts based on what the AI-




weapon system to target 
matching. Assesses both 
probability and utility of 
Course of Actions 
(COAs) by matching the 
BLUFOR readiness, 
locations against target 
locations and types.  
High High 3 Team 
This function requires the operator to 
quickly conduct BLUFOR weapon 
systems-targets matching by fusing many 
data. This is a high-risk function as a wrong 
match could render mission failure and 
disastrous effects on BLUFOR. Hence, a 
LOA of 3 is desired where the operator 
makes decisions based on the 
recommendations by the AI-AMD decision 
aid.  
Engage Issue Orders 
Send orders to individual 
BLUFOR weapon 
systems to lock-on and 




This function requires the operator to 
prepare the orders and send to the 
designated BLUFOR weapon systems. This 
is also a low-risk function as the operator 
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Allocation Allocation Rationale 
ready to engage specific 
targets. 
has already selected the attack options. 
Hence, a LOA of 10 is preferred to 
automate this process once an attack option 
is selected.  
Send Fire 
Command 
Send specific fire orders 
to individual BLUFOR 
weapon systems to shoot 
their allocated targets 
Moderate Moderate 5 Team 
This function serves as a safety mechanism 
to launch an attack on the threat. However, 
this must be carried out quickly. This 
function has a higher risk than issue orders 
as this step is the last step before a weapon 
is launched against the threat. This has 
direct impact on mission success. As such, 
a LOA of 5 is preferred for the operator to 




Monitor and project 
threats and BLUFOR 
weapon systems 
Moderate-
Low High 5 Team 
This function requires the operator to 
constantly keep track of the target status 
and match against BLUFOR weapon 
systems locality and availability. This is a 
high-risk function as failure to assess this 
correctly will result in catastrophic effects 
given that the situation at this stage is even 
more time sensitive. Hence, a LOA of 5 is 
preferred where the AI-AMD decision aid 
helps to determine the COA for the operator 
to approve it.  
Authorize 
Re-attack 
Send specific fire orders 
to individual BLUFOR 
weapon systems to re-
shoot their allocated 
targets 
Moderate High 5 Team 
This requires the operator to select an attack 
option quickly as the threat is impending. 
This function is a moderate risk as the 
operator has to choose a pre-determined 
attack option against the threat. Hence, a 
LOA of 5 is appropriate for this function.  




3. Operator and AI-AMD Decision Aid HMI  
Figure 30 shows the interactions between the operator and AI-AMD decision aid 
of those functions under “team” kill chain functions. The right half of Figure 30 shows the 
AI-AMD decision aid sub-system. The displays of the AI-AMD decision aid sub-system 
represent the system status (e.g., detection data, BLUFOR locations) and external 
environment (threats, environmental conditions, target tracks) in a manner that the operator 
can understand. Controls enable the operator to make direct changes to the system status 
and influence the external environment to achieve his objectives. The left half of Figure 30 
shows the operator sub-system. Information and data ranging from threat details, BLUFOR 
readiness, and COAs from the AI-AMD decision aid display are first perceived by the 
operator. The operator will then process the information to make the decision. The operator 
will then make motor responses (e.g., accept/reject COA) to alter control settings to affect 
a system response. The vertical line between the AI-AMD decision Aid and operator 
represents the Person-Machine Interface (e.g., touch screen display, keyboard, computer 
mouse). This interface allows for the exchanges of information in both directions from 
operator to AI-AMD decision and vice versa.  
 
Figure 30. Schematic of the HMI of “Team” Functions. Source: Hawkley, 
Mares, and Giammanco (2005). 
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For the case of an AI-AMD decision aid allocated kill chain function, the 
interactions between the operator and AI-AMD decision aid are like the “team” allocated 
functions except that operator does not have to carry out any motor responses to effect any 
changes to the system as the AI-AMD decision aid will carry out the actions based on its 
calculations. Nonetheless, the operator will interact with the AI-AMD decision aid by 
observing the outputs of the AI-AMD decision aid through the display maintaining some 
form of situation awareness and be ready for follow-on activities.  
One important observation from the study of HMI between the operator and AI-
AMD decision aid is that the operator’s role has changed from a manual controller of the 
system to a supervisory controller. The supervisory controller is the person in charge of 
continuously receiving and programming information from a computer that is linked to the 
AI-AMD C2 process via artificial effectors and sensors (Sheridan 1992). The operator 
exerts control via the AI-AMD decision aid, an intermediary platform that controls the 
AMD process and gives information to the human (Hawkley, Mares, and Giammanco 
2005).  
4. Design Constructs of Operator and AI-AMD Decision Aid HMI 
The operator and AI-AMD decision aid HMI is further described using the five 
design constructs framework as proposed by Pritchett and Feary (2011). This resolution of 
the HMI’s description would provide a clearer understanding of the operator’s interaction 
with the AI-AMD decision aid. This would then help to find factors that influence trust 
between the operator and AI-AMD decision aid.   
a. Authority 
The operator is responsible and accountable for the success and failure of the AMD 
operations. The operator has the full authority in making critical decisions in those kill 
chain functions that have been allocated as “team.” The AI-AMD decision aid operates as 
an “aid” to assist the operator in providing accurate and quick recommendations and COAs 
to hasten the operator’s decision-making process. As such, the operator would anticipate 
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that the AI-AMD decision aid provides recommendations or COAs that will help the 
operator complete the mission.  
b. Team 
The operator and AI-AMD decision aid can be regarded as teammates where the 
operator is the “leader” who is responsible and accountable for the outcome and the 
decision aid is the member who is supporting the overall operation. A shared mental model 
or situation awareness is a prerequisite for working well as a team. The operator and AI-
AMD decision aid each possesses his requisite knowledge knows what information the 
other party possesses, and knows which information is needed by the other should he seeks 
it. With this shared mental model, there are clear expectations of the allocated functions 
and each other. A shared mental model between the operator and decision aid contributes 
to effective team communication and coordination. Thus, a successful human-machine 
team has its members possess a shared mental model for effective information sharing to 
help each other perform their roles better.  
c. Work 
The work of both the operator and AI-AMD decision aid has been defined through 
the functional allocation as given in Table 17. A clear understanding of the delineation of 
work or functions between the operator and decision aid is necessary to clarify each role 
and responsibility in the team.  
d. Representation 
The interactions of the operator and AI-AMD decision aid are dependent on the 
shared representations of the processes, recommendations, COAs, and decisions between 
the operator and decision aid. External representations, such as interfaces and displays, 
according to Zhang and Norman (1994), can organize cognitive behavior, affect the 
human’s task, and provide information that is easily comprehended and used. For the AI-
AMD decision aid to be perceived as a “valuable teammate,” the representations of AI-
AMD decision aid processes and recommendations must seek to improve human 
perceptual and cognitive processes of the AMD operations for decisive decision-making.  
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e. Interface Mechanism 
The interface mechanism between the operator and AI-AMD decision aid facilitates 
information exchange and actions required by each other to carry out desired behaviors. 
Current interface technology such as computer displays, vocal communication, gesture 
communication, buttons, keyboards, and other input tools to input instructions all have 
limits and present HMI difficulties. A deeper study of interface design is necessary for 
effective HMI for trust to develop.  
5. Implications of the HMI on Trust 
The study on the HMI between the operator and AI-AMD decision aid within the 
AI-AMD C2 system suggests the following:   
First, the discussion on the functional allocations based on decision risks and 
cognitive workload suggests that the operator and AI-AMD decision aid should be 
designed to operate as a “team” across most of the kill-chain functions. Hence, the factors 
relating to both the humans and AI-AMD decision aid must be considered in the study of 
the trust factor. In the study of human-related factors, the subjective factors on human’s 
perception of a trustworthy decision aid should be carried out. On the study of the decision 
aid, factors that contribute to a trustworthy system should also be carried out.  
Second, the notion of a changing operator’s role from a manual controller to a 
supervisory controller suggests that a trustworthy decision aid is important and has a direct 
influence on the operator’s trust in using the system. The operator would expect that the 
system performs as expected to help the operator perform his role better. Also, to further 
help ease the cognitive workload of the operator, the external representation of the 
information, recommendations, and COAs from the decision aid must be easily readable 
and understood.  
Third, the interface mechanism is a critical feature of the AI-AMD C2 system as it 
directly affects the interactions between the operator and decision aid. A poorly designed 
interface will result in a negative experience for the operator which leads to trust 
decrement, even if the decision aid is trustworthy. 
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D. TRUST FACTORS OF HUMANS AND AI-AMD DECISION AID 
This section examines the five major categories of trust considerations that 
determine the amount of trust between the operator and the proposed AI-AMD decision 
aid. Figure 31 shows a summary of the trust factors considered in this thesis. First, factors 
associated with the operational environment which describe the context of the AMD 
operation system are first studied. Second, factors associated with the organizational 
environment where the operator and AI-AMD system have been trained and developed are 
studied. Third, factors associated with building a trustworthy AI-AMD decision aid are 
studied as a trustworthy system is a precursor for warranted trust to develop. Fourth, factors 
that affect an operator’s performance and his attitude on the AI-AMD decision aid are 
studied. Last, the study of HMI suggests a “team” construct between the operator and AI-
AMD decision aid. Hence, “team” factors that influence the relationship between the 
operator and AI-AMD decision aid are proposed.  
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Figure 31. Summary of Trust Factors 
1. Operational Environment and Context 
a. Long Duration of Dull Activity  
The AMD operation is defensive in nature where the operators are waiting for the 
sensors to detect possible threats for follow-up actions. This means that the operator is not 
actively engaged in the operation most of the time. This is especially true for peacetime 
operations where the level of threat is minimal. However, the most problematic 
requirement is the operation still requires the operator to maintain constant vigilance and 
to develop and maintain situation awareness until an anomaly happens. Additionally, there 
may be instances of false detections due to commercial aircraft flying past the detection 
zone. This may cause a decrement in trust over a prolonged period and the operator may 
treat a real threat as a false detection. Another undesirable situation of over-reliance may 
occur too. After a prolonged period of no activity, the operator may become complacent 
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and accepts whatever recommendations or COAs as he loses all his situation awareness of 
the operation.  
Hence, the operator needs to remain actively engaged throughout the operation such 
that the level of trust is maintained. A deeper analysis of how to maintain SA throughout 
the operation especially the period of dull activity is needed.  
b. High Stress Operation  
As reviewed in Chapter III, the evolving threats cause the current AMD operations 
to be more time-sensitive and cognitively demanding. Moreover, the operational 
environment presents uncertainties and variations to the operators due to the effects of 
multipath, clutter, and electromagnetic jamming (Boord and Hoffman 2016). Despite these 
operational constraints, the operators are expected to perform well in their role as 
supervisory control and execute the kill chain functions without errors. These put the 
operators under a lot of stress (Hancock 1989). When the operators are under a lot of stress, 
their ability to control the system and situation decreases due to their high perception of 
risks (Guinot, Chiva, and Roca-Puig 2014). It is documented that stress will degrade 
humans’ basic cognitive capacities. This will reduce the amount of information humans 
can process to understand the situation (Raley et al. 2004). This will reduce performance 
capability (Hancock 1989) and trust.  
On the other hand, the operator might be too reliant on the system such that in time 
of the impending attack, the operator may reluctantly trust the system and accepting all the 
recommendations and COAs without understanding the situation and the logic. This may 
result in catastrophic consequences, like the U.S. Army Patriot missile incidents.  
The operators’ situation awareness must be maintained at the same levels as the AI-
AMD decision aid to ensure that the operator is kept abreast of things to feel confident. 
This allows the operators to understand the situation and understand the recommendations 
made by the AI-AMD decision aid better, which will engender trust. A review of the HMI 
between the operator and AI-AMD decision aid should be carried out. The aim of this is to 
ensure that a sufficient LOA is designed to assist the operator to make sense of the situation 
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for quick decision making while also ensuring that the operator is not overly reliant on the 
system in the long run. In addition, methods on minimizing the number of unnecessary 
stressors such as false alarms, and errors should be analyzed to reduce the consequences 
arising from the high-stress environment.  
2. Organizational Environment  
a. Military Culture and Attitude Towards Automation 
In general, the military culture is characterized as hierarchical, regimental, and 
authoritarian with strong social orders that follow rules and regulations. The military also 
possesses a high level of discipline (Pak et al. 2017). These attributes of a military culture 
developed in high-risk environments can have a substantial impact on how trust develops 
and maintains (Field 2020). Military servicemen, compared to civilians lack the freedom 
of choice. For most militaries, due to the authoritative construct of the military, many 
servicemen do not have the choice to choose the technological systems they operate (Field 
2020). Servicemen may not have default trust in the AI-AMD decision aid if they have not 
been exposed to a similar system or are unwilling to take on the role of an AMD operator.  
Another important aspect of the military is the strong identity forged during service. 
The military identity that is formed with strong attachment bonds within the “military 
family” may have a negative impact on trust towards AI-AMD decision aid. The strong 
attachment bonds are usually established under the narratives of “the perception of being 
involved in something significant and meaningful” (Grimell 2017). The passionate and 
close relationship accomplished through shared mission and hardship may develop the 
propensity to trust each other. However, this established relationship may impact the 
perception of an AI-AMD decision aid teammate as a threat to team camaraderie. AI-AMD 
decision aid may be viewed as a tool rather than a “teammate.” Additionally, servicemen 
develop a strong sense of pride and self-worth being part of this military identity. The 
introduction of the AI-AMD decision aid system to replace some of the operator’s tasks 
may result in distress and rejection in the system (Field 2020).  
Hence, an analysis of how to make the AI-AMD decision aid a more “social” actor 
that interacts with the operators meaningfully through shared experiences should be carried 
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out. Also, the study of the attributes of an operator and decision aid “team” as proposed in 
the study of HMI, are also critical in inducting the AI-AMD decision aid into the military 
“family.”  
b. Military Reliance on Automated Systems 
To deal with the increasingly difficult operating theater, the military will continue 
to employ highly sophisticated and electronically advanced technologies. Specifically, 
automation technology has and will become increasingly important to the military forces. 
An automated system will likely be implemented in every corner of the military, spanning 
from operations, training, force protection, medical, human resource, and logistics. For 
instance, the U.S. military launched several initiatives to leverage AI to enhance military 
decision-making and operations across multiple key operational areas (U.S. DOD 2018). 
As such, it is expected to have more servicemen be exposed to and used automated systems 
in their careers. This helps to increase the automation literacy within the military. This will 
likely raise the level of default trust when an operator is being introduced to an AI-AMD 
decision aid. It is also easier to develop trust with the system as the operator already has a 
pre-conceived perception of the performance of a similar system.  
However, there is a possibility of over-trust on the AI-AMD decision aid as more 
automated systems are being fielded which makes the military more reliant on automation 
technology. This is an undesirable consequence as the servicemen may lose their 
operational competencies in the long term. As such, there must be mechanisms in place to 
prevent servicemen from being too reliant on the decision aid.  
3. AI-AMD C2 System: Operator-Related Trust Factors 
a. Familiarity  
Operators’ previous experience with other automated systems may contribute to a 
higher level of trust in automated systems in general. Operators’ experience can be gained 
through this career of operating different platforms as they progress in the military. The 
new operators to AI-AMD decision aid may start operating the system with a high level of 
default trust gained from operating other reliable automated systems. These operators may 
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welcome AI-AMD decision aid and be more willing to off-load tasks to it. For instance, 
the operators may have prior knowledge of the detection and identification capabilities 
from other systems and assume the same as the AI-AMD decision aid. However, it is 
crucial to highlight that even in highly reliable automation systems, operators with more 
expertise in an automated system may diminish a human’s capacity to watch for unforeseen 
states. (Bailey et al. 2006). This may arise because of the operators’ pre-conceived mental 
model of the system outputs. When these instances occur, the trust may be affected.  
On the contrary, Hawley (2017) argued that the level of familiarity and interactions 
with automated systems is reduced as some functional tasks are allocated to the automated 
system. Evidence shows that when an anomaly happens, the operator will be slower to react 
and take necessary actions (Congress 1984). The operator loses SA when operating the 
system and the operator must scramble “back into the loop” to regain situation awareness 
and make appropriate actions. In the long run, operators may lose fundamental skillsets 
and proficiency in monitoring and controlling the decision aid as they get less hands-on 
experience. 
Despite the fact that the military is fielding more automated systems and operators 
are expected to be more conversant with automation technology, the requirement for 
specific training on AI-AMD decision aid cannot be overlooked. The operational 
environment and system design may cause significant differences in AI-AMD decision aid 
as compared to other systems.  
b. Fatigue due to Prolonged Monitor Supervisory Work  
Operators of AI-AMD decision aids will experience active fatigue during their 
duties. As discussed previously, the role of AI-AMD operators will change from traditional 
manual control to supervisory control. An operator needs to monitor the AMD process 
more than ever. With automation, Operators now must monitor more indicators from the 
system due to an increased number of components. Prolonged vigilance on the system 
involves tough mental work and can be stressful. Research shows that successful 
supervisory control necessitates the experienced operator’s ongoing and meaningful 
involvement with the system. (Hawkley, Mares, and Giammanco 2005). As such, the 
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operators will experience active fatigue to maintain effective supervisory control for 
situation awareness even during a period of normalcy. However, the level of fatigue will 
increase exponentially when an anomaly is detected as the operator’s cognitive workload 
increase because they must execute many tasks in a short time frame. This prolonged period 
of fatigue from a period of peace to impending attack may lead to over-dependence on 
decision aid as the operators may not be able to handle prolonged fatigue. This is 
undesirable as the operators may not be actively “monitoring” the system and approve 
whatever the decision aid recommends.  
Hence, a deeper analysis is required to examine the methods to help the operators 
cope with fatigue arising from prolonged monitoring of the decision aid.  
4. AI-AMD C2 System: AI-AMD Decision Aid Trustworthiness 
a. Predictability and Dependability 
The AI-AMD decision aid’s behaviors should be predictable and dependable to 
positively influence trust development sustenance. It has been demonstrated that 
predictability serves as the foundation for trust early in a relationship (Lee and See 2004). 
A predictable decision aid refers to a system that matches its operator’s expectations. A 
dependable system refers to a system that is consistent and effective in performing the 
allocated functions. The system must first be reliable by design to ensure predictable and 
consistent results. Operators’ trust in the decision aid will increase if the experience with 
the system provides predictable outcomes based on the clearly stated HMI descriptions 
(Cahour and Forzy 2009; Muir 1994). However, there will be a drastic drop in trust which 
will result in disuse or disregard of the decision aid when the operator experiences 
unanticipated reactions from the system (Schaefer et al. 2016).  
Additionally, the predictability and dependability of the system develop with time. 
As the operator spends more time with the AI-AMD decision aid, his understanding of the 
system processes and representations of the information will improve. These interactions 
over time will develop the shared mental model between the operator and the decision aid 
which is critical for trust development.  
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b. Reliability 
Reliability remains one of the most studied attributes of trust in automation. Many 
studies have suggested that reliability has a major influence on trust development (Schaefer 
et al. 2016; de Vries, Midden, and Bouwhuis 2003; Lee and See 2004). Reliability refers 
to the degree to which the AI-AMD decision aid accomplishes the functional duties that it 
was supposed to do consistently throughout time. Due to the errors present, an 
untrustworthy decision aid will impair the operator’s capacity to make decisions. This 
negatively affects the operator’s work performance as the operator must spend more time 
correcting the errors or performing the tasks himself. Because the operator expects the 
automated aid to be accurate and reliable. Donmez et al. (2006) found that humans are 
likely to remember situations where the automated aid made errors than offered the right 
recommendations. This tendency will influence the operator’s view of the automated aid 
reliability. This is an important observation as errors will bound to occur in automation 
systems as no system is perfect. As a result, it may be difficult for the operator to maintain 
a “proper” view of the automated aid’s reliability. This may reduce trust in the system, 
which is unnecessary (Donmez et al. 2006). 
Additionally, the human perception of the system competence such as reliability 
attribute plays an equally important role in trust development. According to research, 
operators’ subjective judgments of trust in an automated system are primarily based on the 
operators’ perceived competence of the system (Muir and Moray 1996). The authors also 
claimed that any indication of ineptitude in the automated system, even if it has little 
influence on overall system performance, will have a substantial impact on the building of 
trust. As a result, the operators must be kept informed of their automated aid’s performance 
in order to maintain their views on the automated aid’s reliability.  
c. Explainability and Understandability 
Other than the reliability of the AI-AMD decision aid, the ability to explain its 
decision-making process and presenting it in an understandable manner are equally 
important. In a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)’s eXplainable AI 
(XAI) research program, it was found that human operators prefer explanations, even if 
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they degrade performance (Gunning and Aha 2019). Furthermore, the more accurately the 
operator understands how the decision aid works, the more trust the operator will have in 
it. As a result, this section delves into the ideas of explainability and understandability. 
Explainability refers to the details and arguments provided by the AI-AMD decision aid to 
make its operation clear or simple to the operator. Understandability assesses the degree to 
which a human operator can comprehend an AI model’s choice (Arrieta et al. 2020). These 
definitions suggest that the understandability of the decision aid is a two-sided matter: 
system model explaining its functions clearly and human understanding the explanations. 
This section discusses two critical areas to improve explainability and understandability.  
First, the design of the XAI model that determines the types, depth, and volume of 
explanation will be studied as the operator will prefer calibrated explanations to help in 
their role rather than explanations that do not add value to the operator (Gunning and Aha 
2019).  
Second, the interactions between the operator and decision will be studied as most 
conflicts and failures in complex systems are caused by these interactions issues 
(McDermott et al. 2018). In particular, the information representation and interface design 
of the decision aid will be discussed in Chapter V. These system constructs directly affect 
what humans perceive and thus affect trust development (Gunning and Aha 2019).  
5. “Team” Related Factors 
a. Commitment  
Satisfaction with the system leads to commitment to the AI-AMD decision aid. In 
many applications, human operators’ perceptions of automation are influenced by their 
level of pleasure. For instance, satisfaction has been demonstrated to improve trust 
development with combat identification (Wang, Jamieson, and Hollands 2011) and vehicle 
automation (Donmez et al. 2006). Arguably, the satisfaction derived from working together 
with the decision aid will affect the trust and relationship between the operator and decision 
aid. For the operator to develop trust and continue to use the system, the operator needs to 
perceive that the AI-AMD decision aid is a “good” and dependable teammate where it 
helps in the operator’s work. The operators must believe that the system is specifically 
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developed to solve their problem (Denning 2016). Attributes such as shared mental model, 
transparency, and trustworthy AI-MAD decision aid are important prerequisites for 
operator’s satisfaction as these factors affect the perception of the decision aid. Hence, 
there should be mechanisms to determine the satisfaction level of the interactions between 
the operator and AI-AMD decision aid and to identify negative aspects of the decision aid 
that causes dissatisfaction.  
b. Shared Mental Model 
The shared mental model between the operator and AI-AMD decision aid is 
established by the authority, intentions, assumptions, clear understanding, and limitations 
of each teammate’s roles and responsibilities. This shared mental model needs to be 
constantly and actively updated and maintained so that the operator and decision aid can 
maintain shared SA in the area of operations and engage in coherent activities to 
accomplish the mission (McDermott et al. 2018). These collaborative actions will develop 
trust between the operator and AI-AMD decision aid over time. Hence, the design and 
description of HMI are critical for the operator to appreciate its limitations and how the 
decision aid assists the operator to perform his task better. Additionally, the explainability 
and understandability in the decision aid are as important to maintain the shared mental 
model as these contribute to how information and decisions are being conveyed to the 
operator.  
c. Ease of Use 
For effective team interactions to occur, the AI-AMD decision aid must be easy to 
understand and use. The scope of improving the ease of use is huge as it encompasses 
anthropometric, physiological, human sensory, and psychological factors. For this thesis, 
only the human sensory and psychological factors will be discussed. On human sensory, 
the vision of the operator is important as the operator spends most of his time looking at 
the monitors. Inappropriate design will result in operator fatigue, frustration, and 
inefficiency (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011). On psychological factors, the most pertinent 
factor is information representation. The method, frequency, appropriateness, and 
timeliness of how information is presented affect how the operator’s capacity to receive 
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and process the information. This process should not add any cognitive burden to the 
operator which is already operating in high-stress and cognitively demanding environment. 
Instead, the overall system which is AI-enabled should reduce the operator’s workload. 
Hence, the factors on human vision sensory and information processing factors should be 
further explored to increase the ease of use of the AI-AMD decision aid to improve trust.  
d. Feedback and Cueing 
In an automated system, feedback and system cues are intimately tied to the 
establishment of trust (Schaefer et al. 2016). The system feedback and cues are important 
interactions between the operator and AI-AMD decision aid. They help to raise the 
operators’ SA and in certain instances, help the operator to focus his attention on urgent 
matters. For example, cues in the form of alarms alert the operator to focus his attention on 
a particular anomaly, thus enhancing his job performance. As a result, the system’s 
supporting actions are beneficial to the operator, increasing trust in the system. However, 
it is also important to note that the frequency and duration of feedback and cues have an 
impact on trust formation (Schaefer et al. 2016). Excessive feedback and false alarms cause 
increased alertness and may be regarded as unnecessary. In the long run, this may degrade 
trust. Hence, the AI-AMD decision aid should provide appropriate feedback and cues at a 
comfortable frequency that value-add the operator’s job.  
e. Time Spent Operating the System  
Another important factor contributing to the performance of a team is the time spent 
together with the system. An operator who has used the system for a long enough period 
would grasp its performance, processes, and reasoning for generating recommendations 
and COAs. Furthermore, the operators’ experience on the system allows them to recognize 
the system’s limitations and be more tolerant of its inherent faults. This helps to develop 
calibrated trust in the AI-AMD decision aid. Yang et al. (2017) discovered that as the 
operators interact more with the automated systems that do not include a learning or 
adaptive element, trust in the system evolves and stabilizes. Yang et al. (2017) also found 
that trust increases with a reliable system and conversely decreases with a less reliable 
system. This observation is likely due to the interactions between the operator’s initial 
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expectation or default trust of the system and its actual performance (Hoff and Bashir 
2015a).  
Hence, there is a need to increase the operator’s experience with the decision aid 
for a trusting relationship before the operator executes a live mission. Additionally, there 
is a need for a feedback mechanism in the AI-AMD decision aid to be able to track 
interactions between the operator and decision aid to measure how trust level has changed 
over time.  
  
116 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
117 
V. PROPOSED STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE CALIBRATED 
TRUST BETWEEN THE OPERATOR AND AI-AMD DECISION AID 
From previous discussions on HMI and trust factors, the approach to achieve 
calibrated trust between the operator and AI-AMD decision aid requires not just an 
engineering solution on the system, it requires a holistic approach. As such, the 
DOTMLPF-P (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, 
Personnel, Facilities, and Policy) solutioning framework is adopted to guide the 
development of the strategy in improving trust between the operator and decision aid (U.S. 
Joint Staff 2018). Calibrated trust occurs when the level of the operator’s trust in the AI-
AMD decision aid matches the AI-AMD decision aid’s capability. This prevents the 
operators from over-trusting the system leading to over-reliance or distrust leading to 
disuse.  
In addition, trust is dynamic and changes with time due to imperfect systems and 
possibly trust violations. There is a need to ensure trust remains at a calibrated level over 
the entire tenure of the warfighters’ posting as AI-AMD operators. As such, the strategy 
consists of two main parts; (1) solutions to achieve calibrated trust between the operator 
and the AI-AMD decision, and (2) solutions to repair trust.  
A. SOLUTIONS TO ACHIEVE CALIBRATED TRUST BETWEEN 
OPERATOR AND AI-AMD DECISION AID 
Figure 32 shows the proposed strategy articulation map to achieve calibrated trust 
between operator and AI-AMD decision aid. The review of the trust definitions, HMI, and 
trust factors suggest that the strategy should focus on three key areas: (1) collective and 
individual humans’ perception of automation technology and AI-AMD decision aid, (2) 
enhancing operator and AI-AMD decision aid team dynamics, and (3) trustworthiness of 
AI-AMD decision aid focusing on system development.  
The strategy proposes three key tenets and five supporting tenets. First, military 
warfighters need to be informed of the true capabilities and limitations of automation 
technology, particularly AI-AMD decision aid. Second, the operator’s training 
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requirements must increase to cope with a new job scope and evolving threats. Third, new 
requirements must be added to the AI-AMD decision aid system development to improve 
the system’s perceived trustworthiness. These three key tenets are supported by the other 
aspects of the DOTMLPF-P framework such as organization, leadership, personnel, 
facilities, and policy. These are discussed in the following sections.  
 
Figure 32. Strategy Articulation Map to Achieve Calibrated Trust between 
Operator and AI-AMD Decision Aid 
1. Doctrine – Shift in Organizational Paradigm  
In the military, there must be a paradigm shift in the way warfighters view 
automation technology and automated systems. AI has received much attention in the 
military as it offers tremendous opportunities to transform many domains of military 
operations, including warfighting, command and control, logistics, security, and 
maintenance, to enhance their overall operational effectiveness. As such, more automated 
systems are expected to be fielded. Machines or automated systems are no longer just tools; 
they are becoming teammates with increasing intelligence and autonomy. For operators to 
work well with the AI-AMD decision aid, there must first be shared beliefs on this system. 
The operators should then be informed of the system’s capabilities and limitations.  
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First, the military leaders and warfighters must be receptive to automation 
technology and systems to use them dutifully in operations. It was found that the 
introduction of an automation system to replace some of the operator’s tasks may result in 
distress and rejection in the system (Field 2020). An organizational-level belief that 
automation technology and AI-AMD decision aid is necessary to achieve mission success 
must be created. Warfighters must not see AI-AMD decision support as a threat to existing 
human team cohesiveness. Furthermore, the possible ethical concerns related to AI-AMD 
decision aid must be clearly defined and addressed. According to a study undertaken to 
assess the public’s default trust in an AI-enabled decision aid used for public services, 
confirmation that the system was not fully automatic led to higher public trust (Aoki 2021). 
As such, the notion that the AI-AMD decision aid being a teammate to provide quick and 
accurate recommendations and COAs must be emphasized to allay people’s concerns that 
it is a fully autonomous system that kills. A great deal of work must be put into 
communicating and demonstrating to military leaders and tactical operators why and how 
the AI-AMD decision aid will benefit the AMD Command. 
Second, senior military leadership must be aware that newly fielded automated or 
autonomous systems such as the AI-AMD decision aid rarely provide all anticipated 
benefits, and errors are bound to happen (Hawley 2017). This paradigm will influence all 
other aspects of developing and operating automated systems such as the AI-AMD decision 
aid. This also influences how AI is introduced into the AI-AMD system after considering 
its potential benefits and limitations. At the organizational level, this paradigm will create 
an organization’s shared perspective of its military personnel on the AI-AMD decision aid 
capabilities and more importantly its limitations. This shared perspective on the automated 
systems will encourage candid conversations on the use of automation and solutions to deal 
with its issues. This candid communication will increase the default trust level of its 
personnel. At the tactical level, operators with the perception of the system’s capabilities 
and limitations will allow themselves to calibrate their expectations of the system. Thus, 
the trust level of the operator on the decision aid can be calibrated appropriately without 
much disappointment resulting in trust decrement or over-confidence resulting in over-
trust.  
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This shift in the organization paradigm on automation will also influence the 
needed support structures to enable appropriate use and trust development of AI-AMD 
decision aids. This will influence the training its personnel will need to leverage on the 
potential of the system and to overcome the inherent limitations of the system to increase 
the overall system effectiveness. This builds operators’ confidence in the system leading 
to higher trust.  
2. Increase in Training Requirements 
“One of the hard lessons of my 35 years of experience with Patriot is that an 
automated system in the hands of an inadequately trained crew is a de facto fully 
automated system.” — Hawley (2017,4)  
One of the earlier insights gained from the literature review is that automation does 
not necessarily make the work easier for the operator. For the AI-AMD operations where 
fully autonomous mode is still not a viable option in near future, the operators will continue 
to remain “in-the-loop” and be responsible for the outcomes of the operations (Scharre 
2018). This change has also demanded a different set of skills from the operator. The nature 
of the work that the operator undertakes has shifted from traditional manual control to 
higher-level supervisory control. The operator is likely going to monitor more indications 
of the system status and alerts. As mentioned in Chapter IV, the nature of long periods of 
dull activity with short periods of high-stress situations will result in fatigue which 
negatively affects overall performance and operator trust in the system. Hence, this requires 
well-trained operators to cope with these new challenges before being deployed as AI-
AMD operators.  
The new training regime needs to address the following issues: disengagement, 
operational stress, fatigue, and system familiarity to enhance “team” dynamics. The new 
training regime would have to be more rigorous than before. Rasmussen, Duncan, and 
Leplat (1987) argued that current and future operators will have to be equipped with the 
same fundamental skillsets as traditional operators and those that help them in performing 
their roles as supervisory control. The authors cited the example of pilots who were solely 
taught to handle airplanes using automated flight control systems rather than being taught 
121 
to fly planes manually. These pilots would not be able to respond if their automatic control 
systems were to fail.  
Skilled performance, according to Ericsson, Krampe, and Tesch-Römer (1993), is 
the result of “deliberate practice,” which they described as a protracted period of active 
learning in which operators continually improve his skills and ability under the guidance 
of a coach. Relevant feedback is provided to help the operators improve. As such, operators 
should be provided with experienced coaches who have operated AI-AMD decision aid 
systems before. Additionally, Lee and See (2004) argued that training is an important 
means to develop calibrated trust as this enhances operators’ understanding of the system 
reliability, problems, and HMI’s impacts on performance.  
On “deliberate practice,” operators should undergo three phases of training: (1) 
simulator sessions, (2) live training with coaches to facilitate active learning, and (3) 
refresher training to maintain proficiency and prevent complacency as shown in Figure 33.  
 
Figure 33. Proposed Training Regime for AI-AMD Operators 
a. Simulator Training  
Simulator sessions provide a cost-effective and low-risk training environment for 
operators. According to Hawley (2017), frequent simulator training is a good technique for 
dealing with operator skill erosion caused by out-of-the-loop familiarity. The simulator 
should mimic the actual operational environment and system interactions to provide good 
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training outcomes for the operators. The training should not just focus on “rote-drills” to 
get the operators qualified to undertake the unit’s operational duties (Hawkley, Mares, and 
Giammanco 2005). The training should instead focus on skills development, critical 
thinking, and problem solving under prolonged and stressed scenarios. Such training 
opportunities that are conducted regularly over a prolonged period allow the operators to 
develop a shared mental model with the decision aid. The operator will understand the 
capability of the system better, its limitations, and more importantly the functional 
allocations and each other’s responsibility. In addition, Wiener and Curry (1980) argued 
for the need to conduct training in manual operations followed by the intended levels of 
automation. They reasoned that for operators to appreciate the benefits and potential of the 
automated system, the operators must have some basis for comparisons.  
However, simulator training alone is insufficient to retain supervisory control 
competency. Training for extreme situations that test the operators’ tolerance to work under 
fatigue and stress is difficult to replicate in simulators. For instance, system errors, faults, 
and random behaviors cannot be simulated. Rasmussen (1986) argued that the skills needed 
by the operators to perform under stressed conditions do not develop during normal training 
or operating modes. As such, live training should be conducted to overcome the 
deficiencies of simulator training.  
b. Live Training 
The objectives of live training are to expose the operators to (1) AI-AMD decision 
aid capabilities, (2) mechanisms and processes of the system in deriving recommendations, 
(3) inherent errors, (4) mechanisms underlying the errors, and (5) actual HMI. The 
operators need these experiences to fully appreciate the system to develop a shared mental 
model with the decision aid. Importantly, the operators must be aware of the inherent 
system limitations or errors such as multiple tracks on a single target to calibrate their 
judgement on the system’s true capability. Additionally, the HMI experience gained would 
allow the operators to gain a better understanding of the decision-making points that require 
attention. With this understanding, calibrated trust can be achieved.  
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In systems with similar operational domains to the AMD C2 system, Ericsson and 
Charness (1994) discovered that competent operators do not need to spend more time as 
much time monitoring the problem-solving scenario as less skilled operators to execute 
their duties well. They also found that highly experienced operators can maintain situation 
awareness (SA) with less effort. They can also re-establish SA in less time and with less 
effort following any disruption. This ensures that the operator is kept abreast of things to 
feel confident. This allows the operator to understand the situation and recommendations 
provided by the AI-AMD decision aid better, which will engender trust.  
c. Refresher Training  
Refresher training must be incorporated to maintain the operators’ proficiency and 
trust in the system. The long duration of dull activity inherent in AMD operation will result 
in disengagement with the system. After a prolonged period, the operator’s skills will 
degrade unknowingly due to the lack of practice. Like human-to-human teams, humans-
to-decision aid mental model, dynamism, and teamwork will suffer because of a lack of 
intimate interactions. Regular refresher training and assessments must be added for the 
operators and decision aid to work together and maintain the mental model developed. 
These training and assessments should include both simulator and live sessions considering 
the trade-offs between budget and training realism. Simulator refresher sessions that cover 
those aspects of the operations that are hardly executed (second half of the F2T2EA kill 
chain functions) help the operators maintain their proficiency. Live refresher sessions help 
to increase the operators’ confidence in the system when carried out in the operational 
environments and produced reliable results and COAs. Also, the live sessions are useful 
from the decision aid perspective as the interactions with the operators can be captured, 
processed, and added into its machine learning algorithm database to train itself. With 
sufficient data, this may help the decision aid to provide proactive feedback to the operator 
to guide his actions. This makes the system easier to use as the operators undergo more 
refresher training.  
In all, extensive and refresher training allows the operators to gain a better 
understanding of the system capabilities and limitations over time. While system issues or 
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errors are unavoidable, familiarity with the system helps to calibrate the operators’ 
expectations of the system and to derive their internal strategies to overcome these inherent 
issues.  
3. Materiel – AI-AMD Decision Aid System Development 
This session of Chapter V discusses the non-functional requirements (“qualities”) 
of the AI-AMD decision aid. Trust capabilities or “trustability,” like quality must be 
designed into the AI-AMD decision aid rather than added after the fact (Palmer, Selwyn, 
and Zwillinger 2016). These requirements include system qualities, system output 
characteristics, and user experience (Palmer, Selwyn, and Zwillinger 2016). Functional 
requirements that directly evaluate system performance, such as reliability metrics, are 
excluded from this thesis because they necessitate a comprehensive technical discussion 
that is outside the scope of this thesis. The desired decision aid is assumed to already meet 
the functional requirements.  
a. Deliberate Functional Analysis and Allocations  
Chapter IV discussed a simplistic version of the functional analysis and allocation 
based on risks and human cognitive workload to describe the HMI. The AI-AMD decision 
aid design requires much more attention and detailed consideration on the human-
automation integration. Human performance and usability factors must be thoroughly 
considered and combined with decision aid capabilities that foster cooperative joint action 
and mutual trust (Chiou and Lee 2021). Effective HMI is achieved by using one’s strengths 
to compensate for the other’s weaknesses across the entire kill chain functions or activities 
(Ezer et al. 2019). For example, it is critical to ensure that the functional allocations do not 
overload or underload operators and that the remaining operators’ tasks and activities are 
coherent (Hawkley, Mares, and Giammanco 2005). Rigorous human experiments and 
research with a diverse group of AMD operators must be conducted at the design stage. 
AMD operators’ involvement at the verification and validation stage of the system 
development is also critical to ensure that the AI-AMD decision aid meets the real 
operational requirements. This continuous involvement of operators helps to build a more 
user-friendly decision aid that the operators want to use and have trust in it.  
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b. Leverage Predictive Analytics to Enhance Interactions and Predict 
Future Scenarios 
One of the most groundbreaking AI innovations being developed now is those that 
permit machines to figure out what individuals are endeavoring to convey. One example 
of such technologies is Google Auto-Complete to suggest search terms (Goldberg et al. 
1992). Google’s search engine builds a personalized user model by combining the user’s 
past behaviors and user behaviors from all over the globe. This model produces remarkable 
results as the search engines can correctly forecast search terms even when the user has 
just keyed in a few letters. While this technology may seem insignificant, it reveals that 
this feature can build connections with specific users over time (Hairston et al. 2012).  
As such, this technology can be adapted to create an individualized AI-AMD 
operator model that is built upon the past interactions between the operator and decision 
aid, and the system database. Specifically, the AI-AMD decision aid can track operators’ 
interactions, performance and inform them. For instance, the decision aid can provide a 
sound alert or visual prompt to the operators when there is a mismatch in the current and 
past activity logs. This can include providing a “nudge” to the operators to direct the 
operators’ attention when the operators have lost SA after a long period of no activity from 
the operators. Also, the decision aid can also provide the operators visual cues to guide 
their actions based on their past actions. This individualized model developed over time 
provides the operators with a “committed teammate” that is consistent and helpful.  
Second, the AI-AMD decision aid should have the capability to conduct future 
scenario prediction to enhance the operators’ SA and to facilitate quick decision-making. 
The system needs to perform “simulation over live data,” which involves building and 
running a simulation on top of the present state that uses up-to-date operational data 
(Palmer, Selwyn, and Zwillinger 2016). For instance, the decision aid can conduct its 
simulations of the likelihood of kill after the operator has selected or approved the targets 
options from the decision aid. The results could be presented in the form of probabilistic 
conclusions to the operators. This information is succinct enough to ensure that the 
operators stay ahead of the situation and do not suffer from the extra cognitive workload.  
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c. Provide Succinct and Calibrated System Feedback  
As previously discussed, system feedback has been shown to contribute to the 
building of trust (Schaefer et al. 2016). The system feedback should be clear and succinct 
to reduce ambiguity (Hawkley, Mares, and Giammanco 2005). Also, the type of feedback 
should be calibrated to the functional task instead of a one-size-fits-all type of feedback 
(Yanco et al. 2016). The type of feedback should help the operator to perform a task by 
providing the necessary information at an appropriate instance. Examples of these include:  
• A simple color (red to amber to green) indication can be displayed highlighting 
the progress of a task like “sending fire command.” On the other hand, text 
message explanation can be provided in a situation where the operators need to 
have a better understanding of the system such as errors.  
• Another important but subtle issue is to clarify “who’s responsible” on every 
critical function/task of the kill chain cycle (Hawkley, Mares, and Giammanco 
2005). A simple visual difference or verbal cue to the operator will suffice.  
• While it is recommended to fuse information from across multiple systems 
within the AMD network to lower operators’ workload, the information on each 
system should not be neglected (McDermott et al. 2018). The AMD system 
involves multiple systems interacting with each other. Undesirable emergence 
behaviors may arise which are hard to predict. This may lower operators’ trust 
in the decision aid. The decision aid should be able to provide information about 
each of the systems under the SoS upon the operators’ requests. Information 
such as the individual sensors’ track of the target, BLUFOR weapon systems 
readiness, and its engagement status can be provided.  
• Explainable AI (XAI) should be adopted to provide succinct explanations of the 
recommendations provided by the decision aid. The designers must adopt an 
operator-centric approach in developing an XAI algorithm that reports 
explanations that are useful for the operators. These include (1) system outputs 
that require explanations, (2) level of details of the explanations, and (3) the 
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representation of the explanations. The decision aid must provide simple 
explanations to allow operators to comprehend the reasoning behind its 
recommendations or COA in a high-stress environment (Ezer et al. 2019). 
These help the operators to understand the situation better which improves the 
operators’ decision-making process.  
This system feedback may enhance the trust between the operator and AI-AMD 
decision aid as they help to improve the operators’ understanding of the situation and align 
the operator’s mental model to the system’s processes and improve 
However, system feedback will inevitably increase the operator’s cognitive 
workload because the operator has to process more information (Yanco et al. 2016). The 
operator should not be loaded with excessive system feedback that is deemed important. 
For interim design, feedback can be targeted on those “teams” allocated functions or tasks 
as the operators will perceive these functions to be more critical and prefer to have more 
information for informed decision-making. A deeper analysis and human research 
experiment are recommended to investigate the impact of this feedback on cognitive 
workload and the usefulness of this feedback. This provides resolution on the overall effect 
on trust as the operators’ interactions with this feedback are uncertain and complex.  
d. Multi-modal Interfaces to Improve Situation Awareness 
The usage of different interfaces can improve operators’ SA by giving effective 
feedback and indications. In a study by Hairston et al. (2012), it was found that the 
operators’ attention span will be restricted if all information is provided in the same mode. 
For instance, simply displaying all the system outputs such as alerts, recommendations, 
explanations on the screen will overload the operator’s visual capacity resulting in a loss 
of SA. Some of these system outputs can be in the form of voice (speech or noise) alerts or 
a combination of both voice and visual displays. The information delivered to unused 
senses is likely to be processed efficiently (Hairston et al. 2012). However, comprehensive 
designs are required to optimally distribute the modes of all system outputs that keep the 
operators engaged and maintain SA throughout the AMD operation.  
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e. Leverage Metacognition Capability to Enhance Understanding 
Metacognition, often known as “knowledge of cognition” (Crowder and Friess 
2011) is defined as what a system understands about itself and its own cognition. 
Metacognition of an AI system can theoretically enable the machine to acquire self-
awareness to better understand its own processes. This would allow the AI system to self-
diagnose and monitor its own uncertainty (Johnson 2021). According to Johnson (2021), 
the metacognition mechanism allows the AI system to avert failures by spotting indicators 
of impending failure and informing a human operator or moving into a safe mode of 
operation.  
This concept of metacognition can be adopted and designed into the AI-AMD 
decision aid to increase calibrated trust by focusing on improving operators’ perception of 
the AI-AMD decision aid and how the decision aid can increase the operators’ 
performance.  
(1) Identification and Reporting of Errors 
No AI system is perfect, and errors are bound to happen. As such, whenever these 
errors occur, there must be mechanisms to identify system errors based on their current 
assessment against past data. With predictive analytics technology, the decision aid could 
also provide recommendations to deal with these errors. These errors and recommendations 
must be presented to the operators for transparency. 
(2) Reporting of Projected Performance with Confidence Levels 
There should be mechanisms to evaluate the projected performance of each sub-
system in the AMD SoS based on their capacity to support a recommended COA. This can 
be accomplished by comparing current system and environment data to historical data to 
create an estimate of the probability of success. The data can be presented with confidence 
levels to help operators calibrate their trust in the system as this reporting reminds the 
operators that AI-AMD decision aid is imperfect and the results of the operators are 
dependent on a multitude of systems (Antifakos et al. 2005).  
129 
(3) Provide Estimates of AI-AMD Decision Aid Trustworthiness  
There should be mechanisms to estimate the trustworthiness of the AI-AMD 
decision aid to inform the operators of their trust in the decision aid and to prevent over-
trust or distrust. It has also been reported that decision-making improves when operators 
are given insights into their trustworthiness (Palmer, Selwyn, and Zwillinger 2016). To not 
incur additional workload on the operators in providing explicit feedback on the decision 
aid, Floyd, Drinkwater, and Aha (2016) proposed an inverse trust estimation method to 
infer how much trust operators have on decision aid. The authors proposed that the system 
self-estimates the trend of operators’ trust (increasing, decreasing, or status quo) based on 
observable trust factors. This could be adopted for the AI-AMD decision aid to estimate 
the trust trend based on its reliability, errors rates, and interactions with the operators. This 
can first allow the system to self-learn and adapt its behavior to further enhance trust 
(Floyd, Drinkwater, and Aha 2016). Second, by displaying the trustworthiness to the 
operator, it enhances their own assessment of the system to calibrate its behavior towards 
the system.  
(4) Inform AI-AMD Decision Aid’s Trust on the Operator in Terms of 
Operator’s Performance Level  
There should be mechanisms to track and evaluate current and past interactions 
with the operators to develop an internal trust model for the operators. This model allows 
the decision aid to detect any operator-induced error or deviation in performance such as 
operator inattentiveness or fatigue. Once the decision aid detects this, it will notify the 
operators of the areas of concern. This feedback allows the operators to develop self-
awareness through the decision aid. This increase in self-awareness helps the operators to 
adjust themselves for better performance.  
f. Cyber Defenses  
The AI-AMD decision aid, like any other AI system, should be safe and secure 
during AI development and during its lifetime of use (Wolff 2020). AI systems can be 
cyber-attacked while they are being developed, coded, trained, tested, and operationally 
used. It is imperative to ensure that the entire systems engineering process for developing 
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AI systems is protected against cyber-attacks. Cyber protection needs to continue to occur 
during operations as well. Any disruption to the operations by the adversary will cause 
unexpected results generated from the system causing operators to distrust the system.  
The use of AI of providing cyber security has gained attention in the literature 
lately. Broadly, AI that uses machine learning algorithms can detect and respond to cyber-
attacks (Sagar et al. 2019). AI can predict if incoming data is potentially harmful or not. 
AI could also be adopted to enhance the cybersecurity of the AI system during its 
development and deployment. Specifically, Zhang et al. (2021) carried out a review on 54 
papers published between 2016 to 2020 on the use of AI to enhance cybersecurity. The 
authors highlighted that AI has been proposed to be used in user access authentication, 
network SA, unsafe behavior monitoring, and unusual traffic identification. The authors 
also presented the challenges and limitations of these methods and proposed a conceptual 
human-in-the-loop intelligence cybersecurity model. This concept leverages the strengths 
of both the humans, who are more flexible to identify new changes in computer network 
and AI machines who are quick in processing large amount of data to provide good 
recognition ability. This concept could be further developed and adapted in the AI-AMD 
system.  
4. Organization  
The AMD command must re-organize itself to strengthen raise-train-sustain of the 
AI-AMD operators. As previously discussed, the shift of the operator’s job scope from 
manual control to supervisory control has indicated the need for an increase in training 
requirements. In addition, the training of AI-AMD operators should be supervised or 
facilitated by an experienced operator to provide valuable feedback. Hence, an AMD 
institute that is responsible for manpower planning, training programs, and logistics should 
be set up to institutionalize the AMD operators’ training and assessment. This setup also 
allows deep expertise on the AI-AMD system to be developed within the AMD community 
as the operators can continue to enhance their skills as coaches.  
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5. Leadership and Education 
With the fielding of more automated systems, there must be a parallel initiative to 
increase the automation or AI literacy within the military. The military services leadership 
must also be educated on the potential capabilities of automation and AI and its limitations. 
Leaders equipped with this knowledge can communicate frankly about automation and AI 
to their servicemen. This creates an environment of a shared mental model on automation 
and AI within the military. In addition, leaders equipped with this understanding would be 
in a better position in stating requirements and aid decision-making during an acquisition 
process of an automated system.  
Education on automation throughout a serviceman’s career should also be 
introduced. This should be conducted both formally and informally. Formal education can 
be included in servicemen’ military courses. Informal education such as workplan 
seminars, leaders’ sharing on specific AI applications, or case studies of a system failure 
can be conducted too. The objectives of this sharing are to increase military servicemen’s 
awareness of the applications of AI and automation and the successes and failures of these 
applications.  
At the tactical unit level, military leaders must be responsible to build a culture of 
reliance on AI-AMD decision aid, just like how a leader builds a close-knit human team. 
The AI-AMD decision aid should not be seen as a tool. It should be seen as a “teammate” 
just like any other operator who shares the same goal of achieving the mission. Leaders 
will be in the best position to influence the operators under their command with the right 
mindset and expectations because of the long duration of time spent together.  
6. Personnel 
AI-AMD coaches are needed to support the new training requirements. This 
personnel should have operational experience with the AI-AMD systems. AI-AMD 
trainees must undergo a long duration of rigorous training comprised of both simulator and 
live training with the system to qualify as trained operators. This builds confidence and a 
deep understanding of the system which helps in trust development. In addition, trained 
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operators who have performed well can be considered to continue as AI-AMD coaches to 
value-add the AMD community by contributing back the wisdom and experience gained.  
7. Facilities 
The new AMD institute should be resourced appropriately to conduct its missions 
to raise, train and sustain AMD operators. To cope with the increase in simulator training 
requirements, simulator training facilities should be built or restructured from an existing 
simulator facility. The facilities should mimic the operational environment that the 
operators are likely to face. For live training, additional systems must be set aside for 
training. Appropriate training grounds and all other resources must be secured to facilitate 
live and realistic training.  
8. Policy 
Two sets of policy changes are proposed to support the key tenets of training 
requirements and system development.  
a. Review Manpower Policy  
First, the manpower policy on the selection and the duration of operators’ training 
must be reviewed. Given the complex nature of AMD operations, Operators for AI-AMD 
decision aid should be an experienced operator who has prior experience in operating 
similar systems. Experienced operators in this field would help the operators to learn the 
skills required to operate the AI-AMD decision aid. Also, experienced operators will also 
have a better understanding of the limitations of automated systems. They will come in 
with an appropriate representation of the system’s capabilities and limitations. Also, the 
criteria in qualifying an operator for operational deployment need to be reviewed. As 
previously mentioned, the emphasis of “rote-drill” must be replaced with both simulator 
and live training results that assess the operators’ adaptive decision-making skills in both 
normal and stressed situations. This means that the assessment period on an operator will 
also need to be increased for accurate assessment. This is necessary to ensure that the 
operator has already acquired a good understanding of the system, both the capabilities and 
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limitations. The initial mental model of the system will be enhanced, and it helps in the 
trust development on the AI-AMD decision aid.  
b. Review Acquisition Processes 
Second, the approach to developing a system in the military needs to be reviewed 
for the deployment of a trustworthy automated system. Hawley (2017) highlighted that the 
current linear system development procedures from requirements definition, 
developmental and operational testing, deployment, and operational use are often 
irreversible. The system design flows in one way irrespective of the downstream effects on 
the system development. Often, the system is evaluated during formal test events 
immediately before mandated project milestone review stages. However, the system at this 
stage is nearly completed and it is difficult to make any major changes to the system. This 
issue is exacerbated by the program office being overly concerned with the program 
schedule and budget. As such, the system may proceed with many issues and uncertainties. 
This is particularly concerning for the development of AI-AMD decision aid as many of 
the design features include human factors considerations described previously. Hence, the 
acquisition for such a system should be iterative in nature with changes in requirements 
and design solutions being accommodated as the system is being developed. This is critical 
as a lot of interactions with the operational users are required to develop an interactive 
interface during system development, and system verification and validation.  
B. SOLUTIONS TO REPAIR TRUST 
The key strategy for trust reparation to manage trust violations focuses on 
addressing the explainability and understandability of these explanations. The dynamic and 
complex nature of the AMD operations causes the behaviors of the decision aid to vary 
based on the environment and threats. Typical trust repair actions in the literature such as 
apology notifications may not be useful when a trust violation such as errors occur (de-
Visser et al. 2016). Instead of proving an apology or any other repair action when an error 
occurs, XAI is adopted where the explanations of the actions are derived and given to the 
operators. Additionally, the explanations should be manipulated and presented succinctly 
to the operators for easy understanding.  
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As illustrated previously, XAI is adopted to provide succinct explanations of the 
recommendations and COA that the decision aid made. All these explanations may or may 
not be presented to the operators. Most of these explanations can be on a “need-by” basis 
as not all explanations are useful or needed by the operators. However, when a mistake or 
an error occurs, explanations could be provided upfront to the operators to understand the 
decision-making logic. The use of metacognition capability may allow the decision aid to 
detect its mistakes or errors and report that to the operators. By combining these 
capabilities, the decision aid can prompt and highlight these errors with explanations and 
possible solutions to deal with such errors. In addition, the explanations should be designed 
to be easily understood by the operators. This allows the operators to quickly comprehend 
the situation and reasons for errors and thus quickly re-establishing back the trust in the 
system. Hence, when mistakes are made, a clear and succinct explanation of the decision 
aid’s actions improves the knowledge of the operators. This increases or maintains rather 




VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis first presented an extensive study of the definitions of trust and HMI. 
The thesis also reviewed the AI-AMD conceptual models, threat scenarios, and kill chains. 
The concepts of trust and HMI were adapted and applied to AMD operations to better 
understand trust and HMI between the operator and AI-AMD decision aid. This thesis 
sheds insights into the identification of trust factors that are relevant for operators and AI-
AMD decision aids. The concept of trust was studied by understanding the system context 
of operational and organizational environments and the interactions between operators and 
decision aids. This eventually led to the adoption of the U.S. military DOTMLPF-P 
solutioning framework to provide a holistic approach to improve calibrated trust between 
operators and future AI-AMD decision aids. 
A. KEY INSIGHTS 
This thesis yielded four significant insights that are applicable to other automated 
or autonomous systems. These insights add value to our understanding of trust between 
human operators and automated systems. 
(1) The Use of Automation Gives Rise to a New Paradigm of Complexity in 
Military Operations 
More automated and autonomous systems will continue to be fielded in the military 
to increase operational effectiveness. The adoption of these new systems has given rise to 
a new paradigm of complexity and challenges for military operations. In the past, soldiers 
and sailors had to contest with the environment and enemy. Now, they are required to use 
automated or autonomous systems to improve their combat effectiveness in a more 
challenging operational environment. However, the employment of these inherently 
complex systems has introduced a new challenge to military operators, who will be faced 
with determining how much trust to place in these systems to achieve what is intended. As 
described previously, neither too much nor too little trust is desirable as these will lead to 
dire consequences. Hence, the military now must learn how to appropriately manage and 
trust these systems to continue to use them effectively.  
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(2) Calibrated Trust vs. Trust  
This thesis on trust highlights that it is not trust that matters, but calibrated trust. 
The military should be concerned with achieving calibrated trust rather than simply focused 
on increasing operator trust in automated systems indefinitely. A focus on simply 
increasing trust will result in over-trust, which will lead to misuse and over-reliance 
without a healthy level of operator skepticism. Calibrated trust is achieved when the 
operators’ trust in the AI-AMD decision aid matches that of the system capabilities. 
Operator’s trust that matches the system capabilities will lead to effective interactions 
which increased overall performance. To achieve this, deliberate efforts must be taken to 
increase the operators’ perception of the system’s capabilities or trustworthiness so that the 
operators’ behaviors can be calibrated accordingly.  
(3) Study Trust in Context  
Trust should not be studied in isolation, just between the human and system. The 
external environment and systems will have to be considered to better characterize trust. 
This thesis has demonstrated that trust can be studied using systems engineering tools and 
processes such as operational needs, threats analysis, and context diagrams. The use of 
context diagrams helped to identify the key systems that interact with the AI-AMD C2 
system. These interactions will help to develop a deeper understanding of trust between the 
operators and decision aid. As such, targeted solutions can be derived to enhance trust.  
(4) Holistic Strategy is Needed to Increase Calibrated Trust 
This thesis has also demonstrated that the approach to achieve calibrated trust 
between the operator and AI-AMD decision aid requires not just an engineering solution 
on the system, it requires a holistic approach. This is a result of the holistic understanding 
of trust from operational, organizational perspectives to the internal systems. The U.S. 
military DOTMLPF-P solution framework has proven to be a useful tool to frame the 
solutions for sustainment trust development. One should not just look at improving the 
system to improve trust for system adoption but also look at the organization’s perspective 
on the technology and the existing support structures.  
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B. FUTURE WORK 
This thesis provided a conceptual analysis of trust and HMI in an AI-AMD C2 
system. While these provided invaluable insights to guide the development of a holistic 
strategy to improve calibrated trust, more indicative results could be achieved if human 
research was carried out. As reviewed, the human dimension in the AI-AMD C2 system 
plays a critical role in describing trust between the operator and AI-AMD decision aid. As 
such, two recommendations on human research are given to strengthen the understanding 
of trust from the human dimension. In addition, the technical aspect of the system needs to 
be explored to better derive the technical requirements of the system to increase its inherent 
trustworthiness too.  
(1) Human Research to Enhance Understanding of HMI 
Human study and experimentation will be required to better understand the 
cognitive workload of AMD operators across the full kill chain. This can be conducted 
with AMD operators executing the operations in a similar simulation environment. The 
LOA across the kill chain functions proposed in Chapter IV could be adopted to validate if 
it is the optimal LOA with live experimentation. Moreover, the LOA across the kill chain 
functions can vary in the experiment to investigate its impact on the operator’s workload 
and performance. This optimal allocation of LOA will influence the five HMI design 
constructs and thus provide insights into understanding trust between the operators and AI-
AMD decision aid.  
(2) Human Research to Determine System Attributes that Enhance Operators’ 
Perception of a Trustworthy System  
Another human research can be carried out to investigate the system attributes that 
enhance operators’ perception of a trustworthy system. This can be done in a form of 
surveys on experienced AMD operators on what they perceive as helpful in understanding 
the information from the system and forming a mental model of the system. To improve 
their performance, AMD operators can also communicate what they wish to see on the user 
interface for each kill chain function. This research will solicit a list of non-functional 
requirements on the system to enhance its perceived trustworthiness.  
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(3) Technical Analysis of the AI-AMD Decision Aid 
In this thesis, the AI-AMD decision aid was assumed to be trustworthy. This 
assumed that the system-related attributes such as reliability, explainability, 
understandability were well-established. A deeper analysis to identify all relevant system 
attributes of trust and the requirement specifications is required for the development of a 
trustworthy system. This study should also be conducted in conjunction with the human 
research mentioned above to synchronize system inherent trustworthiness and human 
perceived trustworthiness. The inherent trustworthiness of the system must be 
demonstrated in ways to allow the human operators to easily understand and develop a 
mental model of it. This allows the operators to develop calibrated trust in the decision aid.  
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